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RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND LAWMAKING 
Kent Greenawalt* 
In this Article, presented as the 1985-86 Thomas M. Cooley Lectures 
at the University of Michigan School of Law on March 10-12, 1986, Pro-
fessor Greenawalt addresses the role that religious conviction properly 
plays in the liberal citizen's political decisionmaking in a liberal demo-
cratic society. Rejecting the notion that all political questions can be de-
cided on rational secular grounds, Professor Greenawalt argues that the 
liberal democratic citizen may rely on his religious convictions when secu-
lar morality is unable to resolve issues critical to a political decision. The 
examples of animal rights and environmental protection, abortion, and 
welfare assistance illustrate situations where such reliance is appropriate. 
In a concluding section Professor Greenawalt inquires into the related is-
sues of the use of religious arguments in political dialogue, reliance on 
religious convictions by legislators and judges, and the limits placed by the 
establishment clause on religiously motivated lawmaking. 
The thoughts I want to share with you concern one aspect of rela-
tions between politics and religion in our liberal democracy. I think I 
can best introduce the underlying issue by putting it in some practical 
contexts. 
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law. A.B. 1958, 
Swarthmore College; B. Phil. 1960, Oxford University; LL.B. 1963, Columbia University. - Ed. 
This text represents a very slightly amplified draft of the Cooley Lectures as delivered. It is 
taken from a much longer manuscript, one that explores a number of subtleties and qualifications 
not dealt with here, which I am presently revising for publication by the Oxford University Press. 
I am grateful for the interest of the law review editors in publishing the lectures basically as I 
gave them. They and I have added only the most essential notes. Readers interested in richer 
analysis and citations can find them in the published book and in more detailed treatments of 
aspects of my thesis to be published in other law reviews. An article entitled Religiously Based 
Premises and Laws Restrictive of Liberty will appear with other conference papers in the Brigham 
Young Law Review; an article entitled The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Con-
viction: Protecting Animals and the Environment will appear with other conference papers in the 
William and Mary Law Review; and a published lecture entitled Natural Law and Political 
Choice: The General Justification Defense; Criteria for Political Action; and the Duty to Obey the 
Law will appear in the Catholic University Law Review. 
I am very appreciative of the warm cordiality with which I was received by faculty members 
and students during the period of the lectures. I learned a great deal about my topic through 
criticisms and questions during those days; I believe, and hope, that the book will be better as a 
consequence. Had it not been for the faculty's invitation to deliver the Cooley Lectures, I 
strongly doubt that I would have undertaken this complex and difficult topic. My work on it was 
much aided during the summer of 1985 by a research grant from the Samuel Rubin Program for 
the Advancement of Liberty and Equality Through Law. A leave from Columbia in the fall of 
1985, during which I was Visiting Lee Distinguished Professor at Marshall-Wythe School of 
Law, College of William and Mary, provided the opportunity for further intensive research and 
thought. I have benefited from the suggestions of faculty colleagues and students at both Wil-
liam and Mary and Columbia. 
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Jean is a legislator deciding whether she should vote for stringent 
measures to protect obscure species of fish from extinction. She decides 
that neither present nor future human interests warrant this strict pro-
tection. But she also believes that the natural environment was created 
by God and that people should not alter it irrevocably if they can avoid 
doing so. 
George is a voter deciding which presidential candidate to support. 
He believes that the economic programs of the Republican candidate 
would promote more general prosperity at the expense of the poor; the 
programs of the Democrat would help the poor at the expense of more 
general welfare. George belongs to a religious group that teaches that 
aiding the poor is the first obligation of society. 
Doris is a prominent lawyer who is asked to support a proposal to 
increase imprisonment and reduce probation and parole radically. Doris 
recognizes that the new regime would involve much pain and unhappi-
ness, but her religiously informed pessimism about human sinfulness 
leads her to think that more imprisonment is needed to repress selfish 
inclinations. 
The question I address is whether people like Jean, George, and 
Doris properly rely on their religious convictions in deciding what 
public laws and policies to support. What do I mean when I say 
"properly rely?" Certainly no one violates any law by relying on his 
religious views when he adopts political positions; any law that at-
tempted such a restriction would be an unconstitutional infringement 
of the free exercise and free speech clauses. So I am not talking about 
legal propriety. I shall address the question whether laws that derive 
from religious convictions may be unconstitutional in Part III, but 
that subject is subsidiary to my major concern. 
When I talk about "properly rely," I also do not mean whether 
such reliance is best overall. Suppose, for example, that George be-
lieves God insists that we support candidates who give priority to the 
welfare of the poor. To say that George would be wrong overall to 
rely on that religious conviction, one would have to give reasons why 
his religious judgment itself was incorrect. I try hard to avoid direct 
claims about theological truth. 
My perspectives for evaluation are the premises of liberal democ-
racy and of our particular liberal democratic polity. When I ask 
whether Jean, George, and Doris properly rely on their religious con-
victions, I mean to raise a question about the implications of member-
ship in a liberal society. Would a good member of our liberal 
democracy rely on his or her religious convictions? 
Even here, I need to be careful. A central feature of liberal democ-
racy is its tolerance of people who urge illiberal political programs or 
rely on illiberal reasoning. At least so long as these people accept legal 
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mechanisms for change, they are not bad citizens, to be condemned by 
the rest of us. So when I ask if people "properly rely" on their reli-
gious convictions, I do not mean that improper reliance deserves con-
demnation. Rather, I am asking about a kind of model of good liberal 
citizenship. 
Understanding of this question is beset with two kinds of confu-
sion. One sort of confusion involves a failure to see clearly what the 
question is. In one presidential debate Walter Mondale attacked the 
demand of the Republican platform that prospective judges have a 
pro-life position on abortion; he claimed that the platform set a reli-
gious test for judges. President Reagan responded that abortion was a 
constitutional, not a religious issue. These rhetorical thrusts exempli-
fied the tendency to oversimplify the question whether a political stan-
dard should be based on a moral premise that in turn may be based on 
religious convictions. 
The perception that the question of religious convictions and law-
making is a simple subcategory of some other church-state problem 
represents another sort of confusion. During the presidential cam-
paign Geraldine Ferraro stated that her personal rejection of the mo-
rality of abortion had no bearing on her public position. The response 
that Ferraro had done no more than reiterate the principles of John F. 
Kennedy's campaign statement to Baptist ministers in Texas that he 
would not let church affiliation interfere with his performance of pub-
lic duty reflects this confusion. A large part of my effort in these lec-
tures will be to demonstrate the distinctiveness of this particular issue 
and to show why no conclusion about it follows easily from common 
premises about church-state separation. 
In Part I, I introduce the subject of liberal democracy, rationality, 
and religion. I explain briefly why this subject merits our attention. I 
then indicate variant positions about it and my own summary conclu-
sions. I develop a partial model of our liberal democracy from which 
the issue can be addressed in context. I next consider two kinds of 
concrete social issues, consenting sexual acts among adults and the 
protection of animals and the natural environment. During this treat-
ment I indicate more fully how religious convictions affect judgments 
about desirable laws, and I analyze the claim that good citizens should 
not rely on such convictions. 
In Part II, I tackle the controversial problem of abortion; consider 
welfare assistance, a critical issue of distributive justice; and discuss 
one of the most sensitive of the traditional church-state issues, public 
aid to sectarian education. These various topics form the basis for 
generalizations about when reliance on religious conviction is and is 
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not appropriate. I also offer some glancing comments on the priority 
of justice, the idea that political issues should be settled on the basis of 
a shared conception of justice, not on the basis of controversial con-
ceptions of the good. 
In Part Ill, I shift from simple reliance of citizens on religious 
convictions to a number of closely related issues. I discuss the appro-
priate grounds of public political discourse and comment briefly on the 
responsibilities of religious leaders and organizations. I then tum to 
the role of public officials and ask whether legislators and judges prop-
erly rely on religious convictions. Finally, I end with a genuinely legal 
inquiry: what kinds of religious underpinnings for a law may render it 
unconstitutional. 
I. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, RATIONALITY, AND RELIGION 
My own interest in this subject will hardly surprise you; lecturers 
rarely pick topics that bore them. My interest is a product of my out-
look and experiences. With some uncertainty and tentativeness, I hold 
religious convictions; but I find myself in a pervasively secular disci-
pline. My convictions tell me that no aspect of life should be wholly 
untouched by the transcendant reality in which I believe, yet a basic 
premise of common legal argument is that any reference to such a 
perspective 'is out of place. This personal and professional dilemma 
helps explain my concern with the place of religious convictions in the 
process by which laws are made. 
The thread of my argument, however, is general. I am not relating 
a personal search for accommodation or explaining where one set of 
religious convictions leads. My analysis and conclusions do not de-
pend on the truth or falsity of any particular religious position; they 
lay claim to a broader persuasiveness. 
I hope my subject will have immediate appeal for those of you who 
also have personal questions about how your religious beliefs relate to 
a secular vocation that involves working toward a better legal order. 
Others of you will have religious convictions whose import for 
political activities is clear. Knowing what those convictions demand 
in your legal and political life, you may feel impatient with efforts to 
classify your actions as inside or outside the bounds of liberal demo-
cratic premises. But your impatience would be misconceived. You 
must deal with people who think that religious convictions have little 
or no proper place in the political life of our country, and you would 
do well to understand how far your own positions are fairly grounded 
in our political traditions. 
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Many of you will hold no religious beliefs or will think that your 
beliefs are irrelevant to what the law should be. This group likely in-
cludes most faculty members at law schools like Michigan and Colum-
bia. Many law professors, like other intellectuals, display a hostility or 
skeptical indifference to religion that amounts to a thinly disguised 
contempt for belief in any reality beyond that discoverable by scientific 
inquiry and ordinary human experience. Those who regard religious 
convictions as foolish superstitions, whose impact on our social life 
should be minimized, may find discussions about the place of religious 
convictions a most unappetizing theme. Yet this is the very group at 
which my comments are mainly addressed. Since these skeptics live in 
a country in which a large number of people are seriously religious, 
they need to understand how far their wish to reduce the influence of 
religion in our political life may fairly be based on claims about the 
premises of liberal democracy and how far that wish must rest on the 
intrinsic foolishness of religion, a foolishness skeptics may be more 
comfortable accepting than trying to demonstrate. 
The problem of religious convictions and lawmaking differs from 
many other important questions about religion and government in a 
liberal society. Problems concerning relations between political and 
religious organizations, public support for religiously sponsored en-
deavors, government sponsorship of religious ideas, freedom for reli-
gious expression, and exemptions from ordinary rules for those with 
religious objections continually arise in the political process and in 
constitutional interpretations. A more abstract and philosophical 
question about religion and a liberal polity concerns the justification of 
political institutions. Can governmental authority and the duty to 
obey the law be persuasively defended in purely secular terms or is a 
religious underpinning required? A related question concerns the con-
ditions of civic virtue: can a liberal government survive and prosper if 
its citizens do not understand its authority and law from a religious 
perspective? Each of these important and interesting issues is different 
from the proper place of religious convictions in lawmaking. 
On that issue we may begin with three major competing positions 
about the responsibilities of citizens. One is that in a liberal democ-
racy citizens are free to rely on any grounds they please, including 
religious grounds. The second position is that citizens should not rely 
on religious grounds for their political actions. A position of this sort 
may also exclude some other grounds besides religious ones. The 
third, intermediate, position, the one I take, is that reliance on certain 
kinds of religious grounds is appropriate but that reliance on other 
kinds of religious grounds is not. 
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My main conclusions, baldly stated, are these. Legislation must be 
justified in terms of secular objectives, but when people reasonably 
think that rational analysis and an acceptable rational secular morality 
cannot resolve critical questions of fact, fundamental questions of 
value, or the weighing of competing harms, they do appropriately rely 
on religious convictions that help them answer these questions. Not 
only is such reliance appropriate for ordinary citizens, legislators may 
rely on their own religious convictions and those of their constituents 
in similar instances; occasionally such reliance is warranted even for 
judges. Though reliance on religious convictions is appropriate in 
these settings, argument in religious terms is often an inapt form of 
public dialogue. Relfance on conceptions of the good and other "fun-
damental" beliefs is often also proper. Even if people were ideally mo-
tivated in their political behavior and political institutions were ideally 
constituted, shared premises about justice and rational dialogue could 
not resolve many political issues. 
I shall explain, qualify, and defend these conclusions. I take as the 
major challenge to my position the claim that religious convictions 
should not count in political activity. But I want to say a few w9rds 
about the first position, that religious convictions, and any other bases 
for judgment, are acceptable in a liberal democracy. Remember, what 
I mean by acceptable reliance is reliance that a model liberal citizen 
might make. The first position boils down to the view that liberal de-
mocracy is a set of procedures for making political decisions, with 
some understood limits on what the majority can do to the minority. 
In this view, which we might call an interest accommodation view, the 
premises of liberal democracy have nothing to say about why people 
support the political positions they do. 
Stated so absolutely, the view is clearly wrong. Within a liberal 
democracy people are permitted to support illiberal outcomes, such as 
the legal subjugation of one race by another, but a model liberal citizen 
does not support illiberal outcomes. So much is obvious. Suppose two 
alternative outcomes are both within the range of liberal positions and 
each is supported by substantial liberal arguments. I believe this is 
true about the present debate over preferential treatment of minorities. 
Opposing preferences because one thinks any racial classifications are 
unjust or reinforce racist attitudes is not illiberal. But opposing prefer-
ences because one hopes to perpetuate the social inferiority of racial 
minorities is illiberal. The premises of liberal democracy do have 
something to say about acceptable bases for political positions, as well 
as about acceptable political outcomes. 
But if we put aside motivations that are themselves at odds with 
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liberal premises, are not people free to decide on any other bases? 
Isn't liberal democracy otherwise indifferent about the bases of per-
sonal preferences? This is a more troublesome question, and all I shall 
do is state my own view succinctly. Some issues properly tum on per-
sonal preferences. Were a vote taken, for example, on whether a bear 
or a snake were to become the state symbol, people could rightly vote 
in terms of pure preference. For such issues, any mode of deriving a 
preference is appropriate, including a religiously based view that the 
bear is a loftier creature. On some other issues, however, a good citi-
zen has a responsibility to decide what is right, not simply to vote his 
preference. I assume that a model citizen should decide in this way 
about such matters as abortion, treatment of animals, capital punish-
ment, and foreign affairs. A person would not be justified in voting for 
capital punishment just because executions give him an emotional kick 
or increase the sales of his sensational newspaper. We expect some-
thing more of the good citizen than these inadequate reasons. As to 
issues of this sort, the appropriateness of relying on religious convic-
tions needs to be defended. Such reliance cannot simply be lumped 
together with other bases of personal preference, and justified on the 
theory that people can vote their preferences. 
I tum now to the second major position, that citizens and officials 
in a liberal dem.ocracy should not rely on religious bases for judgment. 
This position finds fairly frequent expression and occasional system-
atic defense. In a recent introduction to ethics and law, David Lyons 
suggests that political morality should be governed by principles and 
arguments "accessible to all persons." He says that to reject the idea 
of "a naturalistic and public conception of political morality ... is to 
deny the essential spirit of democracy."1 Under this view, citizens 
should not publicly press political objectives on religious grounds, nor, 
we may infer, should they use such grounds to make up their own 
minds about public issues. Two decades ago in a well-known article on 
"obscenity as sin," my colleague Louis Henkin wrote, "The domain of 
government ... is that in which social problems are resolved by ra-
tional social processes, in which men can reason together, can examine 
problems and propose solutions capable of objective proof or persua-
sion, subject to objective scrutiny by courts and electors."2 
This approach receives systematic explication and defense, if per-
haps only incomplete application, in John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, 3 
1. D. LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 190-91 (1984). 
2. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 391, 411 
(1963). 
3. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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the most important work of political theory in our generation. Rawls 
imagines people in an original position who have general knowledge 
but do not know their own personal characteristics, social position, or 
particular conceptions of the good. Behind this "veil of ignorance" 
they choose principles of justice that will best serve their own interests. 
This original position is designed to produce principles that are fair, 
because everyone chooses without knowing what principles would 
favor him in his actual place in society with his actual beliefs and abili-
ties. The principles chosen, Rawls asserts, would consist of a combi-
nation of the priority of equal liberty, equality affair opportunity, and 
a "difference principle" that permits inequalities of incomes and 
wealth only insofar as these benefit a representative person in the 
worst off group. Citizens in an actual liberal society should be guided 
by these principles in their political decisions. Since the standards of 
justice do not rely in any respect on any particular religious perspec-
tive or standard of good, citizens deciding what is just would not rely 
on religious perspectives or controversial standards of good. Factual 
judgments, Rawls has said more recently, are to be based on "practices 
of common sense and science. "4 
The inappropriateness of reliance on religious conviction in politics 
is stated more clearly and absolutely in Bruce Ackerman's Social Jus-
tice in the Liberal State. 5 Regarding constrained dialogue about power 
as the centerpiece of liberal political theory, Ackerman says: 
[N]obody has the right to vindicate political authority by asserting a 
privileged insight into the moral universe which is denied to the rest of 
us .... 
. . . No reason is a good reason if it requires the power holder to 
assert: 
(a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any 
of his fellow citizens . . . . 6 
Not every political reliance on religious conviction actually amounts 
to asserting the superiority of one's own "conception of the good," but 
Ackerman makes plain that the grounds for liberal political decisions 
should be secular and rational. He talks, for example, about the lib-
eral state "deprived of divine revelation"7 in developing a policy to-
ward nature; and, in language that reflects less than enthusiastic 
sympathy with religious perspectives, he precludes restricting abor-
tions "on the basis of some conversation with the spirit world."8 In a 
4. Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 539 (1980). 
5. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). 
6. Id. at 10-11. 
7. Id. at 103. 
8. Id. at 127. 
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review of his book, Richard Flathman speaks of Ackerman's notion of 
"neutral dialogue" as a tolerably familiar aspect of liberal theory; the 
idea of ordering "our interactions by principles neutral among" con-
ceptions of the good is a "self-denying ordinance" which was "histori-
cally first or at least most emphatically adopted in respect to religious 
beliefs. . . . "9 
The thesis that political decisions should be made on secular ra-
tional grounds is a claim about the ethical import of liberal democ-
racy, about what "good citizenship" in that polity entails. My 
rejection of substantial aspects of that thesis derives from a different 
view about the ethical import of liberal democratic premises. Some 
have claimed that a politics devoid of religion will lack coherence, will 
undermine the moral character of our people, and will open the door 
to secular totalitarianism. My focus is different. I do not ask if non-
religious politics are destructive or dangerous. I concentrate on what 
one can fairly expect of religious citizens if one accepts the premises 
that underlie our political institutions. 
I now set out what I understand to be some of the premises of our 
liberal democracy. 
In any liberal democracy, political power is dispersed and ordinary 
citizens have, formally at least, ultimate political authority and the 
right to express themselves in the process of governance. Either by 
constitution or by tradition, government power over individual lives is 
limited. People are free to develop their own values and, at least 
within limits, styles of life; they are free to express their views not only 
on political questions but other human concerns; and they are free to 
develop a wide variety of religious perspectives and practices. 
Relations between government and religion in a liberal democracy 
are not disposed of so simply; but one consistent aspect of liberal dem-
ocratic political theory has been a secular justification for the state. 
Under the dominant theory, social contract, government is justified by 
the consent of the governed and by the government's protection of 
natural rights. These rights can be understood in nonreligious terms, 
and the human interests these rights protect are not distinctly 
religious. 
More important for our inquiry than the justifications of govern-. 
ment are the proper purposes of government. In our constitutional 
order, it is clear that the state should not promote the views of any 
particular religious denomination. Whether governments are war-
ranted in promoting religion generally, or theism, or Judaeo-Christian 
9. Flathman, Equalitarian Blood and Skeptical Turnips, 93 ETHICS 357 (1983). 
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beliefs, is more controversial. The major Supreme Court decisions 
over the past few decades elaborate a basic principle of nonsponsor-
ship. For me, this principle that our government should not promote 
religious truth represents the fullest working out of a sound concept of 
religious liberty, and it most adequately applies our tradition of reli-
gious tolerance and government separation from religion to modem 
social conditions. I proceed on this assumption, though I do not de-
fend it here. I also assume that laws should rest on some secular ob-
jective; they should seek to promote some good that is comprehensible 
in secular terms. 
Some of you, no doubt, will dissent from these assumptions, but I 
hope that dissent will not deprive the rest of what I say of significance. 
My remarks should help you to see more clearly which reliances on 
religious convictions depend on the controversial principle of permissi-
ble support that you accept and I reject, and which can be defended as 
consonant with my model of nonpromotion, the model endorsed by 
those who favor an unabashedly secular polity. 
The question I am addressing is whether these premises of liberal 
democracy, or their implications, or other reasons relating to the na-
ture of liberal democracy, disqualify religious convictions as an appro-
priate basis for political positions. Since religious convictions of the 
sort familiar to us bear pervasively on ethical choices, including 
choices about laws and government policies, reliance on religious con-
victions is inapt only if (1) the religious convictions themselves are 
misguided, or (2) they are disqualified by underlying principles of lib-
eral democracy. 
Of course, the ways in which religious beliefs may· figure in the 
development of ethical and political positions are immensely compli-
cated. An authoritative text, like the Ten Commandments, can pre-
scribe behavior or commend attitudes of heart and mind, such as 
loving one's neighbor. Acknowledged religious leaders may urge simi-
lar prescriptions and recommendations. Religions offer broad per-
spectives on the nature of human beings and society. These involve 
not only general factual appraisals, such as whether people are intrin-
sically self-centered, but also a vision about the "ultimate meaning" of 
human life and its significance in the universe. One's sense of God's 
nature and of human relations to God are also a source of ethical guid-
ance. A religion may encourage special paths, such as prayer or dia-
logue with fellow believers, that aid adherents in making moral 
choices. 
Religious people differ in how certain they are about their ethical 
conclusions. Some feel assured of being right; others poubt that falli-
362 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:352 
ble creatures can ascertain ethical truth, but still believe the religious 
perspective is illuminating. I am going to talk simply about religious 
convictions influencing political positions, but this phrase is a short-
hand for complex and variant interrelations. 
This ends my general introductory remarks. I turn now to two 
particular social issues that illustrate what I regard as a stark differ-
ence between proper and improper reliance on religious convictions. 
I first address the problem of consenting sexual acts among adults. 
Three simple arguments exist against criminalizing acts that di-
rectly affect and substantially affect only those adults who freely 
choose to engage in them, a class of acts into which many consenting 
sexual acts fall. The first argument is that such matters of individual 
choice are none of the state's business. The basic idea, going back at 
least as far as Locke, is that liberal government should protect the 
rights of individuals against infringements by others. Since consenting 
acts do not infringe on the rights of others, no occasion for criminal 
penalties arises. The second argument against restrictions, found most 
familiarly in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, 10 is utilitarian. If people 
are denied the power to live their own lives, the inevitable suffering 
and frustration will be undesirable; successful restraints will stunt ca-
pacities for human development that could benefit individuals and 
contribute to broader enlightenment about fulfilling forms of life. The 
third argument against prohibition is that enforcement is bound to be 
ineffective and that occasional rare convictions will fall unjustly on a 
few unfortunates. 
What rational secular arguments can be mounted to the contrary? 
There is first a paternalistic claim that prohibition is necessary to help 
people resist their own temptations to engage in acts that are psycho-
logically self-destructive or likely to cause harm to them in their social 
relations. This claim has some plausibility for adultery, but it rings 
hollow in respect to most people who want to engage in homosexual 
acts. They apparently are firmly committed in their sexual preferences 
and suffer serious frustration if they refrain from sexual relations. 
A second ground for prohibition is protection of family life. As a 
concern about bad effects on family relations, this argument applies 
most strongly to incest. Sexual involvements among parents and chil-
dren or brothers and sisters may gravely impair family relations, even 
when the persons involved are adults; the prospect of such relations in 
the future could damage relations before children reach maturity. The 
argument about protecting family life hardly is relevant for homosex-
10. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
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ual acts committed by persons who are not married. It reaches extra-
marital sexual acts with greater force. These may undermine 
marriages, and failing marriages are bad for children. Extramarital 
acts may also infringe the rights of spouses. The idea of forbidding 
adultery founders, however, on the frequency of adultery and the im-
possibility of effective enforcement. 
Another ground for penalizing consenting sexual acts rests on pro-
tection of children against the sexual advances of adults; but bars on 
adult sex do not bear any plausible relation to that protection. 
A fourth argument, now applicable most strongly to homosexual 
acts, concerns the physical dangers of unrestrained sexual relations. 
In addition to the traditional worries about venereal disease, there is 
now the grave danger of AIDS, a killing disease passed mainly during 
male homosexual intercourse. 
Finally, a claim may be made that the general moral tone of the 
community will deteriorate if acts most people regard as morally ob-
noxious are not treated as illegal. The most plausible version of this 
claim rests on a connection between sexual morality and parts of mo-
rality that are undoubtedly the state's business. If the state fails to 
enforce powerful sexual mores, the argument goes, people will be so 
dismayed or alienated they will be less inclined to respect the liberty 
and property of their fellows and to contribute to the common pur-
poses of all society. 
With the exception of the criminal prohibition of incest, and put-
ting aside the threat of AIDS, which one hopes is temporary, my own 
judgment is that the rational secular arguments against prohibiting 
private sexual acts among adults are far stronger than the rational sec-
ular arguments in favor of prohibition. 
For us, the implications of this judgment matter more than its cor-
rectness. Imagine that Sam accepts this judgment but also believes 
that homosexual acts are sins that God wants stopped. Sam thinks 
that public coercion and the law's symbolic condemnation of these 
acts are proper devices to curtail these acts. 
I believe that the aim to forbid homosexual acts on this ground is at 
odds with basic premises of liberal democracy. A liberal society has 
no business dictating matters of religious belief and worship to its citi-
zens. It cannot forbid or require forms of belief, it cannot preclude 
acts of worship that cause no secular harm, it cannot restrict expres-
sion about what constitutes religious truth. It takes only a modest 
extension of these uncontroversial principles to conclude that a liberal 
society should not rely on religious grounds to prohibit activities that 
either cause no secular harm or cause too little secular harm to war-
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rant restriction. Freedom to worship and express opinion may enjoy a 
special place in a liberal democracy, but freedom to choose one's pat-
tern of life is also important. The curbing of personal activities simply 
because they conflict with the religiously based convictions of others is 
unwarranted. If the state should not pursue religious objectives or pro-
mote particular religious views, it should not rely on particular reli-
gious views to forbid acts whose impact would not warrant restraint 
on secular bases. 
Though I suppose that the balance of secular arguments is substan-
tially against prohibition, that supposition is not critical. My position 
is that the possible sinfulness of sexual activities is not by itself a legiti-
mate consideration. Sam should either refrain from seeking a prohibi-
tion or acknowledge that his aim to prohibit is at odds with the model 
of liberal democracy presented here. 
There are various responses Sam might make. 
If he urged a paternalistic concern with the spiritual welfare of the 
actors, his objective would clearly trespass the boundaries of what is 
left to individuals in a liberal society. If he argued, however, that his 
religiously informed judgment is that those who commit immoral sex-
ual acts will be less happy and will suffer psychological maladjust-
ments, understood in ordinary secular terms, and that prohibition 
could reduce these harms, his position would not be subject to the 
basic and simple objection I have raised. That position would raise 
questions about factual judgments I discuss in Part II. 
Sam might make another kind of response: that his own freedom 
is involved, that the toleration of sinful sexual activities impinges on 
the lives of himself and his family. He wants to prevent offense to his 
own religious sensibilities and to foreclose the presence of dangerous 
examples. No doubt, toleration of sinful acts may be so viewed by 
some people, but so also may toleration of sinful beliefs and their ex-
pressions. In a liberal society, neither knowledge that others are per-
forming acts that one regards as sinful nor concern about their 
example should count as a diminishment of socially recognized liberty. 
What of the unhappiness that the knowledge of sin causes? Can the 
prevention of such unhappiness be a permissible secular ground for 
prohibition? Preventirig unhappiness is a secular reason, but that does 
not mean it will count very heavily, and perhaps it should not count at 
all. Sam's actual unhappiness over the sinful acts of others may not be 
so great; he has his own life to live. Further, liberal democracy may 
well be understood to make illegitimate arguments for prohibition that 
rest simply on the unhappiness that some people feel about knowing 
that others are committing certain kinds of acts, since permitting pro-
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hibition on this basis could undermine principles of respect for individ-
ual liberty and minority rights. 
These observations highlight a profound theoretical difference be-
tween nonprohibition and more positive aspects of a program that 
seeks to eliminate discrimination against those who perform "deviant" 
sexual acts. If a private employer is told that in hiring he may not 
discriminate against someone he believes is engaging in sinful prac-
tices, his religious liberty is implicated. Religious liberty is also impli-
cated if religious institutions are told they cannot discriminate on 
grounds they regard as religiously appropriate. Since protection of 
religious liberty and the promotion of equal opportunity against so-
cially unwarranted discriminations are both legitimate governmental 
objectives, the model of liberal democracy yields no easy resolution to 
this legislative dilemma. 
If my analysis is sound, at least one kind of religious reason should 
not count for good citizens in a liberal democracy. The aim to prevent 
a wrong judged purely from a religious perspective is not a proper 
ground to legislate a prohibition. 
I turn now to animal rights and environmental protection. What 
do human beings owe to other animals and to the rest of the natural 
environment? What do we owe to other individual entities in their 
individual capacities? What should we do about preserving nature in a 
more general sense? 
Plainly a morality may include duties owed to creatures that them-
selves lack moral capacity. Most people think they have moral duties 
towards members of the human species who have no moral capacity, 
and they also think they have duties not to subject higher animals to 
gratuitous cruelty. Although some philosophers reserve the terminol-
ogy of justice and rights for interrelations among beings with moral 
capacity, I shall employ a broader usage that permits talking about the 
rights of animals. In any event, what is important is whether duties of 
the type and stringency associated with rights and justice are owed to 
nonhumans; that question cannot be settled by terminology. 
The subjects of animal rights and environmental protection both 
concern the place of human beings ill the world. At one extreme lies 
the view that nature, including animals, is for human dominion. At 
the other extreme is the idea that nature is sacred. An intermediate 
conception is one of stewardship: that we have a responsibility for 
preserving the welfare and integrity of the natural world, independent 
of the likely effect on future human beings. Though one might choose 
a morality that recognizes duties to animals and the environment be-
cause the attitudes such a morality engenders will be good for humans, 
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I shall assume that the issue is the starker one: do we owe something 
directly to other entities besides human beings? 
Once one states the major alternatives regarding the relation of hu-
manity to nature, the potential relevance of religious convictions is 
apparent. Religions interpret _the place of human beings in nature. 
Some attacks on present environmental attitudes have portrayed the 
Judaeo-Christian view that nature was created for man's dominion as 
the main villain. It has been responded that major strands of Judaism 
and Christianity give human beings responsibilities of stewardship. 
Some eastern religions accord greater respect t9 nature and animals 
and conceive a less sharp break between human beings and the rest of 
nature. Should liberal citizens disregard such religious perspectives in 
resolving what protection the law should accord animals and nature? 
The answer depends on the promise of secular rational grounds to re-
solve matters. 
I first look at the moral consideration owed individual entities, 
loosely the subject of animal rights. Which entities are owed moral 
consideration in their own right? How does that consideration com-
pare with the consideration owed to human beings? How far should 
judgments of this sort be embodied in law? 
The extreme version of the human dominion view is that other 
entities exist solely for the benefit of human beings. On behalf of this 
view it may be claimed that, because the crucial capacities of ordinary 
humans are unique or so far superior to those of other animals, any 
action that contributes to human welfare is warranted, whatever the 
impairment for other creatures. 
The uniqueness of some human capacities and the superiority of 
others, however, is hardly an adequate reason to accord no moral sig-
nificance to the interests of animals; and most people's intuitive sense 
is that we do owe something to at least some other animals. How is 
the outer edge of consideration to be drawn? We feel we do not owe 
anything to a small stone or a dead twig, so entities deserving consid-
eration must have some capacity or characteristic that stones and dead 
twigs lack. Among the many possibilities are moral capacity, capacity 
for language, self-consciousness, fear of death, fear of other conse-
quences and anxiety, consciousness, ability to experience pleasure and 
pain, having interests, having a good, being alive. 
Despite our difficulties understanding what the experience of ani-
mals is like, we are virtually certain that many of them are-conscious 
and do experience pleasure and pain, and we can be pretty confident 
that many mammals are also self-conscious in some sense. Since 
avoidance of pain is a dominant aspect of human morality, the idea 
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that we should not cause unnecessary pain to animals is an appealing 
starting point, one reflected in statutes forbidding cruelty to animals. 
If a healthy animal is killed, death cuts off the possibility of future 
pleasurable experiences; viewed by itself, death is a harm to the 
animal. What is more troublesome is whether that harm can be effec-
tively canceled by the life of another similar animal. The infliction of 
death on many animals is often part of practices that permit life for a 
larger number of animals than would otherwise exist. Were all people 
vegetarians, many fewer animals of some species would exist; and the 
painless death of some members of the species might be thought fully 
justified by the prospects of life for other members. 
This problem of "replaceability" exposes a critical distinction be-
tween a consequence-oriented approach to the treatment of animals 
and a genuine rights approach. From the standpoint of utility, pain-
less killing can be cancelled morally by substitution, but if an individ-
ual animal has a right not to be killed, then its death is a moral wrong, 
even if the result of "nonkillings" would be a marked decrease in the 
animal population. 
Any judgment about how far the law should be used to protect 
animals requires some assessment of animal interests against human 
interests; here the difficulties become even greater. An extreme prior-
ity for human interests can now be said to be the import of present 
law. Animal life per se is not protected; only unnecessary cruelty is 
forbidden. Virtually any human interest is thought to warrant severe 
inhibition of the lives of animals. Rules concerning animal experimen-
tation do not bar painful experiments and extensive loss oflife, though 
the products being tested are luxuries; indeed a common test of toxic-
ity is to see how intensive a dosage is needed to kill half of the animals 
involved. No rules exist against factory farming, which allows animals 
to do little more than exist in terribly confined conditions so that their 
growth will be quicker and less expensive and their bodies plumper 
than if they roamed free. Restrictions on how owners can treat pets 
are very limited. 
Some of those favoring animal rights argue that we should move to 
a form of equality, one that takes different capacities into account. 
The simple pain of a cat would count as much as the simple pain of a 
human being; but the reasons for avoiding human pain might involve 
people's interest "in being able to have unsullied memories and to 
form and implement future plans with confidence, and in being spared 
a sense of humiliation and rejection."11 On this view, pain of the same 
11. R. ATIENFIELD, THE ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 169 (1983). 
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amount would be worse for a human being because of these correlative 
elements. 
Between near absolute human priority and some version of equal-
ity lies an intermediate view that the higher capacities of humans give 
their interests some greater weight per se. From this standpoint, the 
pain of a person is worse than the pain of the cat just because the 
person has greater capacities, quite apart from the ways in which these 
capacities actually enhance the pain and its effects. 
I shall not develop the arguments for and against these various 
positions. What I have said suggests the tenor of some of the compet-
ing assertions. Rational argument can establish that conscious ani-
mals capable of experiencing pain and pleasure should receive some 
moral consideration and that the pain or death of any such animal is, 
viewed by itself, a harm to be avoided. Rational argument cannot es-
tablish whether replacement justifies the painless killing of animals as 
part of a practice in which more animals are able to live; nor can ra-
tional argument tell us if animal interests should be counted equal to 
human interests in some sense, or if not, how much priority should be 
given human interests. 
Skepticism about rational resolution of animal rights is multiplied 
manyfold for environmental protection. As I shall use the term, an 
environmental ethic concenis itself with safeguarding more inclusive 
categories of being, such as species, the land, the natural setting, eco-
systems, or the biosphere. The worry is not the death or pain of indi-
vidual entities, but human destruction of, or failure to preserve, the 
environment. Should the life of one nearly extinct snail darter count 
for more than the life of one salmon? At least with animal rights, one 
could proceed by asking what capacities that are thought deserving of 
moral protection in human beings also exist in animals; here even this 
exercise in analogy to ordinary moral thinking is unavailable. 
Socialized human life inevitably alters the environment; like other 
species of animals, human beings affect the settings they inhabit. Yet 
many people feel concern about the extermination of other species. 
John Rawls, for example, calls destruction of a whole species "a great 
evil."12 Environmentalists have talked about diversity as a good in 
itself, about the well-being of species, wildernesses, and ecosystems, 
and about the importance of "preserving the integrity, stability and 
beauty of the biotic community."13 
Except as a corrective to present ignorance of future possibilities 
12. J. RAWLS, supra note 3, at 512. 
13. This is the view of Aldo Leopold as reported in R. ATIENFIELD, supra note 11, at 158. 
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regarding human welfare, the claim that people should respect nature 
in its own right is not one that can be successfully grounded in rational 
argument. People have radically different reactions to what nature in 
some larger sense is owed by human beings, and neither analogies to 
ordinary moral constraints nor other forms of rational analysis pro-
vide much assistance in settling who is right. Attaching inherent value 
to the preservation of species, and even to maintenance of the physical 
environment, is not contrary to reason; but such views do require 
some nonrational commitment or judgment of value. 
I want to pause here to say a little bit more about this distinction 
between rational and nonrational bases of judgment and where I place 
religious convictions. I roughly categorize convictions that bear on 
ethical judgments as rational, irrational, and nonrational. I confess to 
considerable uncertainty about where rationality ends; but among ra-
tional convictions I include those that are apparent to anyone with 
ordinary rational faculties or that can be demonstrated or persuasively 
argued on rational grounds. Beliefs that humans have greater ethical 
capacities than leaves, and that love is more productive of happiness 
than hate, can be rationally established. An irrational conviction is 
contrary to what can be established on rational grounds. A nonratio-
nal conviction, in my sense, is a conviction that is not irrational but 
that reaches beyond what rational grounds can settle. 
There is much disagreement about what rational thought can es-
tablish about religious truth, but few particular religions are claimed 
to be establishable on rational grounds alone. Most Christians, for 
example, do not believe that rational argument can persuasively show 
the special place of Jesus Christ. Something more is needed, a commit-
ment through faith or a personal sense that a special place for Jesus fits 
with how one apprehends human existence and its meaning. 
I must be careful here to avoid misunderstandings. I do not say 
that rationality plays no part in religious conviction. A large number 
of conceivable religious premises do appear offensive to reason; reason 
helps us decide what lies within the range of plausible religious posi-
tions. Moreover, highly refined rationality is used in the development 
of particular religious positions and their implications. Belief in the 
Trinity may be nonrational, but an elaboration of the concept of the 
Trinity can be highly rational. When I say that ethical judgments 
based on religious convictions are founded on nonrational premises, I 
mean only that a critical nonrational element is present. 
I also wish to avoid any impression that I perceive a distinct and 
sharp line between rational and nonrational grounds. Some Christians 
do believe that only ignorance, sin, and distorted judgment prevent 
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people from perceiving the persuasiveness of a Christian account. 
What I am interested in, however, are the rational capacities of actual 
people. Many people whose rational capacities are very strong and 
who understand the arguments for and against Christianity do not be-
lieve Christian premises. In real conversations about deep religious 
truth, we must finally say "This is how it seems to me" or "That's 
what my life and experience tell me"; if we are reasonable, we do not 
expect our strongest arguments to convince others whose life and ex-
periences are quite different from ours. That is the truth I mean to 
capture by referring to religious premises as nonrational. 
I have suggested that with respect to animal rights and environ-
mental protection, the place of convincing interpersonal argument is 
decidedly limited. On critical questions, a person must resort to his 
own sense of life and a reflective view that makes him comfortable. If 
I am right, people must inevitably rely to a large extent on nonrational 
judgments in assessing proper legal protections. 
If people must rely on nonrational judgments, should not religious 
believers be able to rely on their religiously informed view of human-
ity's place in the world as they struggle with moral questions and their 
political implications? If rational secular morality provides no correct 
resolutions, or a limited range of possible resolutions, a liberal demo-
crat need not disavow his deeply held religious premises in favor of 
alternative nonrational assumptions that could yield a starting point. 
Rules protecting animals and the environment will constrain the 
choices of those who possess or use animals and natural settings. If 
some of those constrained take the human dominion view, they may 
think environment-protecting regulation infringes on their moral 
rights to exploit nature. At least if animals are involved, a reverse 
choice in favor of human dominion may also be understood by some 
as a violation of the rights of the unprotected animals. Society cannot 
avoid deciding how far to protect animals and other natural entities. 
Decisions to protect may not usually work severe impositions on those 
of differing view, but they will curb liberty in a way some think is 
unjustifiable. This reality does not make reliance on religious convic-
tions inappropriate, because everyone must make nonrational judg-
ments about entities that deserve protection. Given those judgments, 
the nature of the protection afforded is called for by secular objectives. 
Thus, my conclusion about reliance on religious conviction is radi-
cally different here than with respect to simple religious notions that 
actions are offensive to God. Liberal citizens should not impose their 
religious views of what is simply immoral on their fellows; they should 
not seek to use the law to implement those views. But liberal citizens 
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may properly refer to their religious convictions when they decide 
what entities deserve protection from the political community. I shall 
develop the reasons for this conclusion somewhat more deeply in the 
next section after I consider the problem of abortion. 
II. ABORTION, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, AND 
SECTARIAN EDUCATION 
In Part I, I suggested that in our liberal democracy, citizens should 
not attempt to prohibit activities just because they think they are 
wrong from a religious point of view; but I also said that religious 
convictions properly figure in decisions about which entities to protect, 
when rational morality does not answer such questions and the kind of 
protection afforded can be justified in terms of secular objectives. To 
illustrate that point, I used the issues of animal rights and environ-
mental protection. In the first half of this section, I offer another illus-
tration, the controversial problem of induced abortion, and I say a few 
words about why problems like abortion prove so intractable for ra-
tional secular morality. In the second half of Part II, I turn to other 
issues of value and to factual uncertainties, suggesting that for the 
good liberal citizen religious conviction has a place in respect to these 
as well. Both parts of my discussion challenge claims that political 
issues can be resolved on the basis of shared principles of justice and 
scientific methods of discovering facts. 
Abortion is a tragic problem for our society. What some people 
sincerely regard as murder others see as the exercise of a fundamental 
human right. The level of mutual understanding is low. Many of 
those who favor abortion see the pernicious influence of religious views 
on the political process; others respond simplistically that abortion is a 
moral, not a religious, issue. 
Some claim that liberal principles require people with religious 
convictions about abortion to "check them at the door." As with 
animal rights and environmental protection, the plausibility of that 
view depends on what can be resolved by rational secular arguments. 
My aim here is not to make one more contribution to the debate over 
the proper legal treatment of abortion; but to avoid misunderstanding 
let me state that my own personal positions are that Roe v. Wade 14 
was wrongly decided, but that, were they free to decide, legislatures 
should adopt a permissive approach to abortion, and that a constitu-
tional amendment requiring or allowing restrictive state laws would be 
undesirable. 
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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The nub of the question whether a restrictive abortion law can be 
justified turns on the point at which a fetus warrants significant protec-
tion from society. The issue is so intractable because of the sharp di-
vergence over the fetus' moral status. Those who think, for example, 
that at the moment after conception a fetus, or more strictly at this 
early stage a zygote, has moral rights as full as those of a newborn 
baby tend to regard abortion very differently from those who think 
that moral rights arise only at a late stage of pregnancy or at birth. If 
rational secular morality is to resolve public policy about abortion by 
itself, it must either resolve the stage of development at which the zy-
gote, conceptus, embryo, or fetus warrants protection, or show that 
the propriety of various legal regimes can be answered independently 
without such a judgment. 
At least two basic arguments for permissive abortion laws do not 
rest on assigning the fetus an intrinsic moral status that is less than 
that accorded newborn babies. One is associated with Judith Thomp-
son's famous analogy to a violin player who can only survive if con-
nected to another's body.15 The assertion is that since one individual 
has a right not to have his body used against his will to sustain the life 
of another individual, a woman cannot be compelled to use her body 
to sustain a fetus, even if the fetus is valued as highly as a living 
human being. This basic argument has been richly developed by Don-
ald Regan, in an article defending Roe .v. Wade on equal protection 
grounds.16 The argument is most powerful when pregnancy results 
from rape; then a woman finds herself pregnant without any responsi-
bility on her part. In ordinary pregnancies, however, the woman has 
voluntarily acted in a way that she knows risks a dependence relation-
ship between her and a new being, and she has in fact helped generate 
that relationship. It is not unreasonable to believe that the woman 
who has chosen to risk giving life to what we are now assuming to be a 
new human being should have a moral duty not to terminate that life 
within her body until it can survive on its own. 
A different argument in favor of permissive abortion laws starts 
with present social reality. The essential claim is that enforcing a re-
striction on people who do not believe in its bases and will not comply 
is inappropriate. Many women believe they have a moral right to have 
abortions and many will have them whatever the law says. Abortions 
will be less safe if they are illegal, and the law will burden poor women 
much more than those who can travel elsewhere or pay for safe illegal 
15. Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). 
16. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979). 
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abortions. These difficulties should give one pause about a prohibition, 
even if one is convinced that the fetus is morally entitled to protection 
as a full human being. That is evidenced by Mario Cuomo's thought-
ful explanation of why he is presently opposed to a more restrictive 
legal treatment, though he accepts the Catholic Church's moral teach-
ing about abortion. 17 If one has doubts about the moral entitlement of 
the fetus, these worries press more strongly in favor of a permissive 
law. 
If a fetal life definitely counts as much as an ordinary human life, 
however, a legal prohibition of abortion, with minimal enforcement 
efforts, almost certainly will save some lives; the number of fetuses 
who will not be aborted will exceed the number of pregnant women 
who will die because abortions are less safe. Such a law may also influ-
ence moral attitudes in the direction of protecting fetal life. Despite 
strong rational arguments about the rights of pregnant women and the 
terrible toll of illegal abortions, the person who believes that the fetus 
is entitled to full protection may reasonably decide that prohibition is 
warranted to save fetal life in the short and long runs. 
I conclude that the appropriateness of a permissive legal approach 
to abortion cannot be demonstrated if one concedes that the fetus is 
intrinsically entitled to as much protection as an ordinary human be-
ing. But that assumption is not necessary for what I want to claim 
about reliance on religious convictions. Suppose I am wrong; suppose 
that rational secular arguments can establish the ill wisdom of a gen-
eral prohibition of abortion regardless of the moral status of the fetus. 
Other questions of law and policy will still make that status crucial. 
Should public financial assistance be given for abortions? Should 
methods of terminating pregnancies that destroy possibly viable fe-
tuses ever be allowed when other methods might produce live births? 
Once technology permits, should the fetus of a woman who discontin-
ues a pregnancy be grown outside her womb even if her wish is that it 
be destroyed? These questions may require decision about the status 
of the fetus, even if the right to end a pregnancy can be established 
independently. 
And what of the timing of the basic right to terminate a preg-
nancy? Roe v. Wade permits severe restrictions on abortion after the 
sixth month of pregnancy, and many states impose such restrictions. 
But even such restrictions may not be warranted if the fetus properly 
has no moral status prior to birth. 
17. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's Perspective, l NO-
TRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POLY. 13 (1984), also published in N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 25, 
1984, at 32 (speech delivered at University of Notre Dame, Sept. 13, 1984). 
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If the moral status of the fetus is critical for appropriate legal pro-
tection, rational secular analysis could resolve the issue if it could indi-
cate that status at relevant stages of fetal development, or if it could 
show what the law should do in conditions of uncertainty. 
We need initially to put aside two red herrings. The first is 
whether the fetus is alive. What one can uncontroversially say is that 
the fetus is a living, growing entity with the genetic composition of a 
human being, but one that for most of a pregnancy is incapable of 
independent life. That appraisal does not settle whether the fetus de-
serves moral consideration. The second red herring is the hope that 
science can resolve the moral status of the fetus. Science as a disci-
pline about empirical truth can tell us the characteristics of a fetus and 
its possibilities for independent life. Science in the form of improving 
technology can actually advance the point at which a fetus can survive 
outside the womb. But neither factual knowledge nor technology can 
establish how much consideration the fetus deserves. 
-< Our society lacks any shared decisive moral principle that estab-
lishes when an entity that will grow into an ordinary human being 
deserves protection, and rational thought may be incapable of settling 
upon one among the plausible candidates. Our culture, in its struggles 
over the status of the fetus, starts with a relatively firm consensus that 
we do not owe anything to potential individual entities that might be 
brought into being and that, for most purposes, a newborn baby has a 
moral status like that of mature people and deserves equal legal pro-
tection of its life. 
If infants warrant full moral consideration and legal protection 
and potential zygotes warrant none, how do we determine the moral 
consideration and legal protection of the fetus? For proper moral con-
sideration, one can distinguish a "sharp break" approach from a 
gradualist one. A "sharp break" approach posits one or more particu-
lar points at which the moral status of the fetus changes drastically. 
There could be one critical point, often cast rhetorically as the time 
when one becomes a person, when the change is from no moral consid-
eration to full consideration, or two or more points at which the 
amount of consideration owed increases dramatically. A gradualist 
approach would conceive the moral status of the fetus as increasing 
slowly and steadily over time until it reached that of the newborn in-
fant. In each successive period the balance of contrary interests neces-
sary to override those of the fetus would increase. The law of abortion 
could not directly embody a gradualist approach, but a law expressed 
in terms of discrete stages could be justified by a gradualist theory of 
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moral consideration, it being recognized that the law could only 
crudely reflect the more subtle moral reality. 
There are many possible stages of significance. Complex social 
practices, including many legal rules, make birth a critical point in the 
life of a developing human. But it is hard to say that the fetus is owed 
no moral consideration prior to birth. Suppose that a woman's obste-
trician has advised that labor should be induced after an unusually 
long pregnancy, and that hours before the scheduled delivery, the 
pregnant woman has the fetus's life terminated. Many would regard 
this as just as wrongful as killing a newborn baby. But if birth is not 
the obvious place to draw a sharp line, no other stage in the develop-
ment of a fetus has even that plausible a claim. 
"""The Supreme Court has fixed on the prospect for life outside the 
womb as being critical for legal protection of the fetus, but that stage is 
not self-evidently crucial for the moral status of the fetus! If the basic 
point about abortion were the unfairness of imposing on the pregnant 
woman, then viability would be obviously significant; at that point a 
woman wishing to free her body of the fetus should attempt to have it 
delivered in a manner that it may survive. However, because doctors 
refuse to induce premature labor without strong medical indications, 
the import of laws forbidding abortion in the last trimester without 
medical reasons is that most women must then carry their fetuses to 
term. This suggests that the viable fetus has an enhanced moral status, 
but why does it? 
Birth involves a kind of organic independence and alters the way in 
which the fetus is dependent, but survival still depends on the exist-
ence and efforts of others. When the fetus becomes viable, it moves 
from being necessarily totally dependent in one way to being conceiva-
bly able to be totally dependent in another way. It is not easy to un-
derstand why the capability to be totally dependent in a different way 
gives the fetus a right to remain dependent organically until natural 
processes end that dependence. 
As with the problem of animal rights, the attempt to fix the moral 
consideration owed the fetus involves an effort to determine what 
characteristics give beings inherent value. What makes the inquiry 
about the fetus special is the particular puzzle about potential capacity 
and its significance. How far does an entity's potential capacity bear 
on its present inherent worth? 
The intuitive moral sense of most people in our culture is that both 
potential capacity and present, or past, characteristics count. The felt 
relevance of present characteristics is shown by the sense that the 
more a fetus is like a baby, the more consideration it is owed. Yet, 
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present characteristics alone do not seem determinative. One reason 
why newborn babies and late fetuses are thought to have so much 
value is because of what almost all of them will become. 
This mix of present characteristics and potential capacity is not 
very neat as a way to assign value. Various theories avoid its anoma-
lies. Classic utilitarianism makes potential capacity ultimately critical. 
What is morally good, it asserts, is a maximization of happiness. 
Given that aim, one's present capacity to feel pain and pleasure confers 
no special status; what counts are one's future possibilities for exper-
iencing pleasure and pain and how one's treatment and actions will 
affect others. If a present early fetus is capable of experiencing more 
future happiness than an existing human being, then, other considera-
tions aside, its interests should be preferred. 
Both this conclusion and the broader implications of the emphasis 
on potential capacity are strongly counterintuitive. The utilitarian 
view that entities should be valued only as potential receptacles for 
pleasure and pain has the startling implication that one has as much 
intrinsic reason to bring into being potential entities as to protect ex-
isting ones. Could some all-powerful individual increase happiness by 
wiping out all existing human lives in favor of a new race of beings, 
that would be morally good. 
Of course, a utilitarian might respond that I have disregarded the 
crucial human capacity to feel fear and anxiety; if mature human life is 
treated as cheap, everyone will feel insecure. But if fear and anxiety 
are the critical capacities, newborn infants are indistinguishable from 
fetuses; future development is needed before either would warrant the 
protection accorded to more mature humans. 
To avoid these difficulties, a utilitarian might suggest that the aim 
should be a maximization of happiness of entities that now exist or 
that will, in any event, exist in the future. On this construction, the 
possible future being of potential entities would not be protected. 
Such a principle, however, affords no standard to decide when the 
threshold is crossed between potential being and existing being. The 
utilitarian might respond that no animal counts as an entity until it is 
born or is viable, but neither of these lines can be drawn out of utilitar-
ian premises. 
In contrast to exclusive emphasis on potential capacity, some au-
thors have argued that until actual capacity is acquired, moral status, 
or at least full moral status, is inappropriate. Killing a fetus, or a new-
born baby, is seen either as not inherently wrong at all or as less wrong 
than killing a mature human being. It is true that fetuses presently 
engage in no moral practices and now totally lack communicative and 
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moral capacity. But that much is true of newborn infants. There is no 
convincing reason why a culture should not protect entities that will 
develop communicative and moral capacity and relate reciprocally 
with present mature members of the society. John Rawls, indeed, sup-
poses that newborn babies should be protected under a principle defin-
ing moral personality "as a potentiality that is ordinarily realized in 
due course."18 Once such potentiality is regarded as relevant, no clear 
basis exists for drawing the line at birth and not extending protection 
to fetuses. 
\. Rational secular analysis cannot resolve the moral status of the 
fetus at various stages, nor, more generally, can it tell us how far po-
tentiality should matter for the inherent worth of beings already living 
in some form. 
Though I have spoken of inherent unresolvability on rational secu-
lar grounds, my thesis requires only the weaker assertion that most 
people cannot settle the status of the fetus on these grounds. If they 
cannot do so, they will have to turn elsewhere. 
These pessimistic conclusions about the power of rationality may 
be unpalatable to full-blooded rationalists, but they should not sur-
prise us. The borderlines of moral status are among the most intracta-
ble questions for those developing comprehensive moral positions. 
Rationality has an extensive domain concerning the conditions of a 
moderately peaceful joint social life, and the choice of means to ac-
complish valued ends. Rational analysis may also suggest what we 
owe other beings we recognize to be like ourselves and establish stan-
dards of coherence for testing whether one moral position is out of line 
with other positions an individual or culture accepts. 
But many borderline questions about moral consideration do not 
yield easily to these approaches. The question typically is how we are 
to count the welfare of entities that are in some ways like us and in 
others not like us. Many different positions on borderline questions 
will fit comfortably with otherwise similar moral postures, as is shown 
by sharp disagreements about abortion and animal rights among peo-
ple who agree across a wide spectrum of other moral issues. 
These controversial questions of status expose a serious flaw in 
claims that shared principles of justice can be employed to resolve 
political issues. Rawls and other writers on this subject assume that 
the fundamental issue is whether justice takes priority over ideas of 
"the good"; if justice does take priority, it is supposed that derivations 
of basic principles of justice plus empirical facts will provide the 
18. J. RAWLS, supra note 3, at 505. 
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grounds for resolving political issues. These accounts omit the need 
for society to resolve matters of status as well. People who agree on 
what justice to "persons" demands may disagree radically about the 
minimum conditions of personhood or about what we owe nonper-
sons. Many political issues implicate these debatable questions of sta-
tus. What are just legal regimes for farmers and hunters depends on 
the moral consideration owed animals; the proper liberty of a pregnant 
woman turns on the moral status of the fetus. Unless the reigning 
theory of justice itself resolves all borderlines of status, many political 
issues involving claims of justice among full human beings can be re-
solved only with determinations about debatable claims of status of 
other entities. 
If rational thought cannot settle the status of the fetus at various 
stages, perhaps it can tell us that the status is uncertain and indicate 
the right response to this uncertainty. Unfortunately, however, there 
are competing responses to the possible uncertainty. One is that peo-
ple should be regarded as morally permitted to do what they think is 
probably morally permissible, especially if powerful reasons support 
their actions. The contrary response is that the taking of innocent life 
should not be risked. Because the kind of "risk" involved here is so 
different from ordinary risks based on uncertain facts, I believe other 
moral practices provide unsure footing for resolving this issue. 
Another possible way to resolve legal policy would be to say that 
in cases of conflict a rationally grounded claim of right should take 
priority over a claim of right that rests crucially on a nonrational value 
judgment. 
Put in absolute terms, the asserted priority of rational grounds is 
implausible. Suppose it were admitted that a regime of protection for 
the remnants of a species rested on a nonrational judgment, and that 
the desire to kill members of the species was based on rational eco-
nomic reasons. Given the minimal impairment of liberty of a protec-
tive law, the nonrational judgment should be able to prevail over the 
rationally grounded economic reason. 
The hard question concerns two competing claims of roughly 
equal power in terms of the premises each asserts. One might so view 
the competing claims on behalf of pregnant women and fetuses, the 
liberty claim on behalf of the woman, if sound, having roughly the 
same strength as the fetus' claim to life, if sound. When the claims are 
of roughly equal power but a widespread consensus exists about the 
priority of the nonrational claim, liberal democracy does not require 
that citizens forgo use of the law to protect that claim. Thus, the lives 
of newborn infants can receive full protection even if the moral status 
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of infants cannot be established on rational grounds alone. Should the 
rational claim take priority if it is roughly equal in power and if no 
consensus supports the priority of the nonrationally grounded claim? 
I would reject even this principle, because I think that it assigns too 
high a place for the products of rational analysis as opposed to deep-
seated feeling; but I do see this principle as a serious competitor to my 
own position. 
- If the moral status of the fetus and desirable legal policy are not 
resolvable on rational grounds, individuals must decide these ques-
tions on some nonrational basis. For many persons, the basis for judg-
ment is supplied in whole or part by religious perspectives, which 
either indicate the fetus' moral status or gravely influence one's mode 
of thinking about it. 
As I suggested in Part I, no evident basis appears to assign a prior-
ity to nonrational, nonreligious judgments over religious convictions. 
Neither sort of judgment is fully susceptible to critical appraisal and 
rational discourse. VOnly a society that was actually hostile to religion 
or riven by religious strife could think it preferable for people to rely 
on nonreligious, nonrational judgments rather than upon religious 
convictions. 1:t has been said that Christianity was largely responsible 
for the growth of the idea that newborn babies should have their lives 
protected. Whether or not that is true, it certainly is true that our 
country has a rich religious tradition and traces its cultural roots to a 
civilization in which religion has been a major element. Even posi-
tions that are not consciously religious are often deeply influenced by 
religion. It would be odd to say that premises can legitimately play a 
role only when an individual does not consciously hold them on reli-
gious grounds or when their religious roots have receded far enough 
into the past to be largely forgotten. 
Most religious believers will be hard put to evaluate the status of 
the fetus or animals in purely secular terms. The matter is not one of 
weighing evidence pro and con, but of adopting one of a number of 
debatable perspectives about how to look at a problem. If one believes 
he already has a clear answer or an overarching perspective on the 
relevant question of value that is derived from his religion, he may find 
it impossible to decide what perspective he would otherwise adopt. 
Even when the religious believer consciously relies mainly on natu-
ralistic arguments, important religious premises may lurk in the back-
ground. For example, the idea that God gives people souls at some 
point in development may influence someone to look for one critical 
point, a point where a shift occurs from virtually no moral status to 
full moral status. When this approach is combined with an emphasis 
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on strict duty, and in particular the strict duty not to take innocent 
life, reflected in traditional Christianity and Judaism, the approach is 
highly unfavorable to any claim that the pregnant woman's interests 
override those of the fetus when the two conflict. 
The inability of most people to perceive the distinctive import of 
their religious views certainly makes one skeptical that their influence 
could be eradicated. The proponent of secular bases of judgment may 
respond that his point is only that citizens should try to decide on 
secular grounds alone. But asking that people pluck out their religious 
convictions and take a fresh look, disregarding what they presently 
take as basic premises of moral thought, is not only unrealistic. It is 
positively objectionable, because it demands that people try to com-
partmentalize beliefs that constitute some kind of unity in their ap-
proach to life. 
We hear frequently that reliance on religious convictions to oppose 
permissive abortion laws violates the liberal principle that the religious 
convictions of one segment of society should not be imposed on the 
rest. But in respect to abortion, the religious perspective informs a 
judgment of who counts as a member of the community, a judgment 
that I claim each citizen must make in a nonrational way. Once that 
judgment is made, a restriction on abortion may be thought to protect 
life, the most obvious and vital interest that members of the commu-
nity have. Such restrictions do not violate premises of liberal 
democracy. 
In the remainder of Part II, I contend that the proper place of 
religious convictions is not limited to unusual borderline questions of 
status. I suggest that rational secular evaluation is incapable of resolv-
ing some other questions of value and conflicts of value and some com-
plex matters of fact. If citizens must rely on nonrational premises in 
these respects as they decide what laws to support, religious citizens 
may appropriately rely on their religious convictions. I illustrate these 
points in connection with welfare assistance, a critical issue of distribu-
tive justice. I also use this exercise to comment further on Rawls' the-
sis that political issues of justice can be resolved on the basis of shared 
principles of justice. I then turn briefly to a typical church-state issue, 
and conclude that citizens should not have to decide it independently 
of their religious premises. Finally I address a possible limit to reli-
ance on religious conviction, that such reliance is inappropriate if the 
religious convictions yield conclusions that actually are irrational. 
Liberal societies must determine how far the government should 
assist people who cannot provide adequately for themselves. Welfare 
policies, of course, involve complicated judgments about who will be 
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recipients, what form assistance will take, and which government shall 
provide it, but I shall oversimplify matters by talking of more and less. 
Secular morality presents two rather sharp theoretical extremes 
about welfare, as well as intermediate possibilities. One extreme is that 
the state should perform only those minimal functions that private or-
ganizations cannot perform. It should protect people from force and 
fraud, otherwise leaving resources to be distributed by private order-
ing. The animating principle here is that persons have some kind of 
natural right to their own bodies and talents and that this right ex-
tends to free exchanges with others. Under this view, the state has no 
responsibility to improve the lot of those whose incapacity or laziness 
leaves them poor. The opposite extreme is that the government, as the 
collective organization of the society, is responsible for the distribution 
of social resources, that it should treat all persons with equal concern 
and respect, and that resources should be distributed equally unless 
people generally (in some sense) will benefit from an unequal 
distribution. 
The distributive view takes many forms. Among the most familiar 
are the Marxist formula, "From each according to his abilities, to each 
according to his needs," the utilitarian principle of maximizing aver-
age or total welfare, and Rawls' suggestion that distribution should be 
equal, except as inequality increases social goods even for representa-
tive members of the least advantaged economic group. 
A choice among various distributive approaches will depend on 
some initial premise about human equality and upon complex judg-
ments about human nature and real or potential social relations. In 
some passages Rawls seems, almost arbitrarily, to define the condi-
tions of the original position so that they will yield his "difference 
principle." His best argument against utilitarianism is that people will 
feel resentful if they find themselves worse off than others and live in a 
society in which the gains for the better off are thought to justify losses 
for the worse off. Rawls' best argument against the Marxist formula is 
that its adoption would reduce incentives to work and impair 
productivity. 
A utilitarian may respond that Rawls overestimates the resentment 
that people would feel in a society guided by utilitarian principles; the 
Marxist may claim that Rawls fails to see the resentment that the dif-
ference principle would generate and that he disregards the willingness 
of people, once free of capitalist social conditioning, to engage their 
talents for the good of others. From these standpoints, the judgments 
that divide Rawls from utilitarians and Marxists are largely factual 
ones about how people will respond to social orders with alternative 
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principles of justice. In conception, such questions may be resolvable 
by rational criteria, but the relevant questions are extremely complex; 
their answers depend on counterfactualjudgments about which no one 
can be confident. In competition are subtly different understandings 
of the springs of human motivation in radically variant and unrealized 
social orders. 
Rational secular inquiry can demonstrate the unsoundness of cer-
tain extreme views. I believe that liberalism does involve a limited 
commitment to rational modes of thought, that a good liberal citizen 
should not adopt a political position that is clearly irrational according 
to common sense and scientific evidence. But how is the citizen to 
choose among plausible accounts when rational thought cannot pro-
vide a basis for selection? A person's conclusions about likely facts in 
this setting will be determined by his personal experience, his peculiar 
sense of human life, and his nonrational commitments of value. If 
everyone ultimately relies on some nonrational basis to determine 
these factual questions, religious premises should not be disfavored in 
comparison with other nonrational premises as people select among 
rationally plausible alternatives, especially in a society with a long-
standing tradition of serious religious commitment. A person who has 
a deep sense of original sin, or intrinsic human self-centeredness, de-
rived from his understanding of the Bible should be as free to reject 
the Marxist formula of distribution as a nonreligious person whose 
private experience leads him to believe that human beings are ir-
reducibly selfish. 
Beyond this basic notion of equality among nonrational judgments, 
there lies a further reason for permitting reliance on religious convic-
tion, the unrealism of asking people to detach themselves from basic 
convictions about life's meaning that bear on what they believe is em-
pirically true. Holding out this exercise in detachment as an ideal to-
ward which good citizens should constantly strive would be unwise. 
Counsels of impossible perfectionism are not well suited to the stan-
dards of good citizenship; what makes a good citizen should be reason-
ably attainable by ordinary people. The strenuous effort to attain 
detachment would inevitably have psychological costs. As I have al-
ready suggested in respect to abortion, demanding that people divide 
integrated perspectives into compartments would impair their sense of 
personal unity and integrity. 
I now return to the "hands off" position that people are entitled to 
the fruits of their talents. If that position is defended on the ground 
that it promotes economic productivity and human growth better than 
any unmitigated distributive position, then the grounds for its support 
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are factual in theory. In that event, what I have just said about com-
plex factual judgments applies. Suppose, instead, that a defender of 
moral entitlement concedes that overall welfare might be higher were 
a distributive theory adopted; he may still claim that others simply do 
not have the moral right to treat the fruits of one's talents as up for 
general distribution. Then the basic disagreement between a distribu-
tive and a "hands off'' approach is over values, over ultimate catego-
ries of moral right. 
Rational secular arguments do bear on this fundamental disagree-
ment. A defender of a distributive position may appeal to the social 
character of humans and to the extent to which our very talents de-
pend on social benefits. The extreme "hands off'' advocate can urge 
that each person's mind and body is his own in an important moral 
sense. He can claim that viewing each person as having a right to all 
or part of the fruits of his talents is an easy extension of this basic right 
to one's person. 
Rational arguments point powerfully against the "hands off'' ap-
proach as a practical standard for public policy. The idea that the 
state simply has no responsibility to care for those who would lack 
food and shelter if left to private ordering is in tension with ordinary 
moral standards concerning reciprocal support and the state's unique 
capacity to coordinate. 
Though the "hands off'' view is implausible in its pure form, some 
moral right to the fruits of one's talents has much more attraction as a 
reason for settling between the two extremes. Many people do feel that 
the fruits of people's talents are not wholly up for distribution in the 
way of a common benefit that drops on society like manna from 
heaven. They may believe that a person is entitled by right to a sub-
stantial percentage of the fruits of his talents, at least if all minimum 
needs are met. This intermediate position allows a person to endorse 
the welfare state without completely forgoing the idea that people have 
some basic moral rights to the fruits of their talents. 
Rational argument cannot settle whether people have any basic 
moral right to the fruits of their talents and, if so, how far that right 
should be curbed or qualified in the interests of general welfare. As 
with other issues we have examined, nonrational judgments of value 
must determine choices among a number of plausible competitors. 
What is the role of religious convictions in the resolution of these 
basic welfare issues? The Christian and Jewish traditions strongly em-
phasize duties to care for the poor. A person steeped in the biblical 
tradition might conceivably think that private charity is the only 
proper way to help the poor; but the present consensus that an ex-
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treme "hands off'' position is implausible derives partly from wide ac-
ceptance of religious duties of care. 
Among the distributive models, "to each according to his needs" 
may come closest to the Christian ideal of universal loving concern 
and to the actual organization of early Christian communities. A 
Christian perfectionist might well think we should all try to live our 
lives accordingly. On the other hand, traditional Christianity has a 
powerful strand of realism about the depths of human selfishness and 
the limits of social organization; most Christians believe that large 
modern political societies should be organized on principles other than 
gospel perfectionism. 
Once we understand the limits of secular morality and the subtle 
role of religious conviction, we will be unlikely to say that liberalism 
somehow requires individuals to try to forgo all reliance on religion in 
developing their positions about appropriate levels of welfare. 
What I have said about welfare assistance provides a vantage point 
to criticize further the idea that political problems of distributive jus-
tice can be resolved exclusively by reference to shared fundamental 
notions of justice plus factual determinations. The criticism I offer 
here is not limited to special cases of determining status; it reaches the 
heart of the very issues John Rawls and others suppose can be deter-
mined according to shared principles of justice. 
Recognizing that citizens in liberal societies have variant religious 
beliefs and ideas of the good, Rawls begins with premises that are 
widely shared by people who disagree on many fundamental ques-
tions. From these premises, he aspires to draw principles of justice 
whose acceptance allows political decisions to be made without refer-
ence to the fundamental religious and metaphysical beliefs that divide 
citizens. As Richard Rorty puts it, our concentrating on questions of 
social justice will allow subjects such as the "point of human existence, 
the meaning of human life" to be "reserved to private life."19 
Contrary to what Rawls supposes, he does not provide a theoreti-
cal basis for thinking that this ambition is either realizable or 
desirable. 
The critical question for this purpose is the status of Rawls' differ-
ence principle, the principle that inequalities must work to the advan-
tage of the worst off group. Let us suppose, as Rawls does, that there 
is some notion that organizes "familiar intuitive ideas" in a liberal so-
ciety, and that the notion is "a system of fair social cooperation be-
19. R. Rorty, The Priority of Democracy Over Philosophy (paper delivered at Bicentennial 
Symposium on the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, Charlottesville, Va., Sept. 21, 1985). 
December 1985] Religious Convictions and Lawmaking 385 
tween free and equal persons."20 Many of those who accept this notion 
think that all people have some basic moral right, however qualified, 
to the fruits of their talents; others accept the idea that the fruits of 
talents are to be distributed as is best for all. Holders of these diver-
gent views can join in agreement on the organizing intuitive idea about 
fair cooperation between free and equal persons. Lawyers and politi-
cians are familiar with the way agreement on some common verbal 
formulation can work. Such agreement often obscures divergent an-
swers to important questions. Agreement on the basic organizing idea 
of fair cooperation among free and equal persons can unite those who 
have contrary views about any moral right to the fruits of talents. 
Rawls' own principles of justice adopt a purely distributive view 
about the fruits of talents. But he presents no sound reason why some-
one who has begun with a contrary sense of a moral right to talents 
should abandon that position when practical decisions must be made 
about the level of redistributive transfer payments in a society. It can-
not be said that prevailing liberal notions already incorporate the dif-
ference principle. Probably most Americans do not now accept an 
undiluted distributive view. They retain something of the traditional, 
Lockean, natural rights view, that people have a basic right to enjoy 
the fruits of their labors. Even if I am wrong about this, people are 
free in a liberal society to urge shifts in prevailing conceptions and to 
work for political programs that are in some tension with those con-
ceptions. Superiority cannot be claimed for the difference principle on 
the ground that it is derivable from, or fits better with, the fundamen-
. tal concepts of liberal democracy. Within the loose umbrella of the 
premises of liberal democracy, there is room for more than one ration-
ally sustainable theory of justice. Certainly any derivation from the 
original position does not demonstrate the rational superiority of the 
distributive view over the moral rights view, since the conditions of the 
original position already embody the distributive view. Nor does the 
elegance and clarity of Rawls' principles establish their rational superi-
ority over some more complex and qualified alternative. 
A more realistic view of principles of justice in any liberal society is 
that different citizens accept different sets of principles, but ones that 
have critical overlapping parts. When decision falls squarely within 
the overlapping areas, no reference outside shared assumptions is re-
quired. But when a matter is one as to which the truly shared prem-
ises do not provide an answer, citizens will revert to their own 
preferred theories, including whatever religious and metaphysical con-
20. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 229 
(1985). 
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victions underlie them. Religious convictions, therefore, play a proper 
role in some citizens' decisions about distributive justice in a society 
that has some important shared ideas about justice. 
Religious practices and institutions have not been directly at issue 
in any of the social problems I have discussed thus far. Here I want 
briefly to extend what I have said to such obvious church-state ques-
tions. The main point that I wish to make could be made in connec-
tion with a moment of silence in public schools or accommodations to 
claims of religious conscience, but I shall focus on aid to religious in-
stitutions that confer secular benefits. 
Many religious organizations perform social services that have un-
doubted secular benefit. One thinks of religious hospitals, religious 
schools, and religious charities for the poor. If the state chooses to 
help finance private conferrals of such benefits, its failure to assist pri-
vate religious organizations may compromise its efforts and constitute 
a discrimination against religion. If the state includes religious organi-
zations, it may end up aiding the religious purposes of the organiza-
tions. At this time, financial aid to religious hospitals and charities for 
the poor is noncontroversial; these enterprises are simply treated like 
other private organizations. Aid to religious schools, on the other 
hand, is marked by intense controversy and continuing constitutional 
litigation. The twofold explanation for the difference concerns the spe-
cial place of the public school in the United States and the perception 
that religious instruction pervades parochial education. 
Neither liberal principles nor constitutional clauses provide pat an-
swers to the degree of acceptable support for religious organizations 
that make direct contributions to secular objectives. Assuming that a 
form of aid is constitutionally permissible, how is an individual citizen 
to decide whether that aid should be given? Let us concentrate on 
private schools. Here, if aid is to be given to all private enterprises, the 
vast majority of beneficiaries will be religious organizations. How 
does one compare the importance of assisting the schools' secular 
objectives against the risks of assisting their religious objectives? Judg-
ment will depend partly on how valuable one thinks private parochial 
education is. Can this judgment be made without reference to one's 
religious convictions? If someone believes that the best education for 
children is by religious organizations, a view that does not by itself run 
afoul of liberal principles, he will be inclined to suppose that giving 
state support to secular functions warrants the risk of oblique support 
for religious objectives. If someone believes that religious training is 
misconceived and harmful or that a state school environment can best 
promote the attitudes necessary to maintain a liberal pluralist society, 
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he is likely to take a rather different view of harms and benefits of state 
aid. One's own religious convictions are bound to figure in one's esti-
mate of the ideal place for religious education, as well as whether one 
wishes to have one's own children supported in religious schools. It 
may be at odds with liberal democratic principles to favor a particular 
law or policy because it will promote one's own religious views or be-
cause it will help satisfy one's religious conception of the education 
children should have, but a good citizen need not disregard his reli-
gious convictions in assessing the balance of undeniably relevant secu-
lar arguments. 
I conclude that reliance on religious convictions is appropriate 
under any plausible model of liberal democracy much more often than 
is acknowledged by those who claim that only rational secular 
grounds are proper for political decision. But it does not follow that 
such reliance is always apt. I suggested in Part I that liberal demo-
crats should not try to prohibit behavior just because they believe it is 
offensive; they should assess programs in light of their capacities to 
serve secular objectives, not because of their promotion of separable 
religious objectives. 
I am inclined to accept another qualification whose dimensions 
and proper import are much harder to discern, a qualification that 
concerns a conflict between religious conviction and rationality. 
The most obvious conflict of religious conviction and rationality 
occurs if one's religiously based factual conclusions clearly contradict 
rational estimates. Imagine that Thomas concedes that rational secu-
lar analysis yields no plausible basis to suppose that the earth will suf-
fer a cataclysmic flood in three years, but he believes that inerrant 
scripture indicates the certainty of such a flood. Without doubt, 
Thomas is warranted in taking steps with cobelievers to minimize the 
effects of the predicted tragedy, but is he warranted in trying to engage 
the efforts of the government? 
The best theory of liberal democracy may require that people fol-
low rational modes of thought in their political judgments when these 
lead to solid conclusions; that degree of commitment to a common 
method of discourse and thought may be owed to others of diverse 
convictions in a pluralist society. If this is granted, Thomas would not 
act in accord with the premises of liberal society if he tried to engage 
the state in a project that would be senseless given any rational secular 
assessment of the facts. 
Value judgments can also contradict rationality. Suppose that 
Norma acknowledges that gray cats have no scientifically ascertain-
able capacities greater than other cats and that they have less capaci-
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ties than dolphins, but she believes that gray cats are sacred and 
should be protected above all other animals. She is, of course, perfectly 
free with her coreligionists to try to obtain as many gray cats as possi-
ble and to treat them with great respect and consideration, but if she 
urges a political program based on the view that gray cats inherently 
deserve more legal protection than other cats and dolphins, she may 
depart from the spirit of liberal democracy. 
Perhaps reliance on religious grounds such as these is inappropriate 
even when rational thought is inconclusive on an issue, but I shall pass 
over that more troublesome problem here. 
This concludes my remarks about citizens relying on religious con-
victions to make political decisions. In Part III, I tum to related mat-
ters: the terms in which political positions are advocated, official 
reliance on religious convictions, and possible interpretations of the 
establishment clause. 
Ill. POLITICAL DISCOURSE, OFFICIAL ACTION, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
In Parts I and II, I have urged that even though a model of our 
liberal democracy includes a limited commitment to rationality, it 
leaves considerable room for religious citizens to rely on religious 
grounds for moral judgments that affect law and public policy. lfl am 
correct, any hope that all political issues can be resolved solely on the 
basis of commonly shared premises about values and commonly 
shared approaches to factual knowledge must be abandoned. To aban-
don this hope is to free oneself from a misguided illusion, not to forfeit 
any vital premise of liberal democracy. 
In this Part, I shall discuss a number of related issues concerning 
the quality of political dialogue and activity, official choices, and con-
stitutional standards. I tum first to guidelines for the public articula-
tion of political positions and the organization of political interests. 
Saying what liberalism implies as to these matters is troublesome. 
Much depends on how the open discussion of religious grounds for 
positions will be taken, especially by those who reject the underlying 
religious convictions. For this reason, one must have in mind a partic-
ular stage which this and other liberal societies have reached. 
I believe that now in the United States there is (1) a substantial 
consensus on the organizing political principles for society; (2) a 
shared sense that major political discussions will be carried on primar-
ily in secular terms; (3) a respect for religious belief and activity and a 
hesitancy to attack religious practices as nonsensical; and (4) an as-
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sumption that one can be a seriously religious person and a liberal 
participant in a liberal society. With these assumptions, we can de-
velop some rough guidelines for political behavior for persons with 
religious convictions, though prudential assessments must largely sup-
plant clear lines of principle. 
A deeply religious person will want to work out the implications of 
his convictions for his political views and activities. He will rightly 
discuss political issues in those terms with coreligionists, seeking to 
gain insight and to persuade. Religious leaders similarly bring their 
religious convictions to bear when they address members of the faith; a 
Christian minister appropriately preaches about why the Gospels re-
quire pacifism or a nuclear freeze if he believes that they do. When 
persons of different religions share some common religious conviction, 
such as the idea that God commands aid to the poor, that conviction is 
properly invoked in discussions among them. 
Open public discussion is more difficult. When a citizen writes a 
letter to a newspaper, should he now try to persuade on the grounds of 
religious arguments? Very roughly, my answer is that he should not. 
The government of a liberal society knows no religious truth and a 
crucial premise about a liberal society is that citizens of extremely di-
verse religious views can build principles of political order and social 
justice that do not depend on religious truth. The common currency 
of political discourse is nonreligious argument about human welfare. 
Public discourse about political issues with those who do not share 
religious premises is properly cast in other terms. 
This straightforward conclusion needs to be qualified in various 
ways. I want initially to introduce four exceptions. One concerns dis-
course that is one or more steps removed from ordinary political advo-
cacy. An author writes an article on Jewish perspectives on nature for 
an environmental journal. Most readers of the journal are not Jewish. 
But the article is not written in a manner that presupposes that most 
readers accept Jewish perspectives. The article serves at least two pur-
poses for non-Jewish readers. It informs them of the implications of 
one important religious and cultural perspective in our society; and by 
introducing a perspective that varies from their own, it may enrich 
their sense of the significance of their own perspective and of alterna-
tive possibilities. Even if the article is about Christian rather than 
Jewish perspectives, the nonreligious reader, or the reader from an-
other religious tradition, is not likely to feel left out, in the way that he 
might if public advocacy over welfare assistance seemed to turn on 
whose interpretation of Christian doctrine was more sound. 
The second exception concerns the discourse of religious leaders. 
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Religious leaders are, in a sense, experts on religious perspectives; they 
may devote much of their time to figuring out the import of the basic 
religious convictions they accept. When they speak about public is-
sues, their special competence has to do with their religious under-
standing. If, for example, a statement by Catholic bishops on the use 
of nuclear arms looks just like a statement that might be made by any 
secular political leader, we feel something is missing. We expect a 
contribution that reflects the unique position of the bishops. Here a 
delicate balance must be struck. The Catholic bishops' statement 
should make some effort to root the positions it takes in Catholic un-
derstandings about war and military weapons; but if the statement is 
designed to have general influence, it should also contain language and 
ideas that have a broader appeal. In part, the effort should be to cast 
ideas that conform with Catholic understandings in as generalized a 
form as is possible. 
The third exception is already illustrated by the previous examples. 
Often there will not be a sharp distinction between how one reaches a 
general audience and how one reaches fellow believers. The bishops' 
statement on nuclear weapons is not only addressed to the community 
at large, it is also designed to enlighten Catholics about what their 
faith implies. A writer whose primary intended audience is Christians 
concerned with environmental problems may assume he will reach 
more of this audience in a general journal about the environment than 
in any specialized religious publication. Because there is no neat way 
to reach just the audience one intends, the line between communica-
tion with cobelievers and the general public cannot be exact. 
A fourth exception concerns proselytizing. Suppose a religious 
speaker's intended audience is a general one, but the main point of his 
discourse is not to promote a particular political program but rather to 
convert others to his religious beliefs. A person who is trying to per-
suade others to religious convictions may understandably wish to con-
vey some of the moral and political implications of those convictions; 
that may affect their appeal for nonbelievers. People generally are 
aware that many religious believers seek to proselytize in this manner. 
Discourse of this sort that develops connections between religious 
premises and political conclusions does not make nonbelievers feel left 
out, as does general political advocacy in religious terms. 
Is there yet another exception to my general proposition that fully 
public political discussion should be carried on in nonreligious terms? 
Are there some religious premises that are so widely shared that they 
are properly a subject of such discourse? What I have in mind are 
premises like "God loves us all" or "Social justice is a duty to God as 
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well as to other humans." Though interpretations differ, these pro-
positions unite virtually all Christians and Jews, as well as adherents 
of many other religions. Since in the United States relatively few peo-
ple consider themselves atheists or agnostics, such premises coincide 
with the religious beliefs of a high percentage of the national popula-
tion. Are arguments in these terms an appropriate part of general ad-
vocacy? That may depend partly on how much of the population does 
not accept the premises, and that varies considerably in different sec-
tions of the country and among subgroups. At major eastern universi-
ties, where many students and faculty do not believe in God, a 
polltical argument cast on even such broad religious premises would 
be inapt. But one might reach a different conclusion about a civic 
speech in Utah or rural North Carolina. A separate reason to eschew 
reliance on these religious premises is their considerable indetermi-
nateness; they are not likely to be much assistance in resolving genu-
inely difficult issues of public policy. 
Why should it matter if religious premises are shared? Why isn't it 
all right to advocate political positions in terms of narrower religious 
convictions? After all, a public speech relying heavily on religious ar-
guments might be expected to reach some coreligionists and others of 
like view. In a very religious but extremely tolerant society, public 
airing of particular religious views might work well; but in actuality 
such discourse promotes a sense of separation between the speaker and 
those who do not share his religious convictions and is likely to pro-
duce both religious and political divisiveness. If public argument is 
seen to turn on which interpretation of the Christian tradition is 
sounder, non-Christians may feel left out and resentful. 
I need to enter an important caveat here. I have been discussing 
the use of religious premises to support controversial positions on pub-
lic policy. Religious terms may also be employed to enjoin divine 
assistance, to emphasize the fallibility of human efforts, to call people 
to act on conscience, and to remind us that all we do is subject to some 
higher judgment. Though even this employment of religious discourse 
may offend some nonbelievers, it does not involve practical choices 
being weighed in terms the nonbeliever rejects. Thinking of our coun-
try's strong tradition of reference to the divine, and eloquent examples 
like Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address, I find this sort of use of reli-
gious terms appropriate even at the national level. 
My basic thesis, that fully public discourse advocating political po-
sitions should be nonreligious, is subject to two related objections. 
The most straightforward objection is that my proposal promotes a 
degree of concealment that is immoral and unwise. If citizens rely on 
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religious grounds, shouldn't they say so and explain their reasoning? I 
begin with the assumption that political discourse mainly involves ad-
vocacy of positions arrived at, not full revelation of all the bases by 
which a decision is reached. We do not expect a speaker to reveal all 
the nonrational judgments that have led him to his position; we expect 
him to put forward considerations that will appeal to others. Effective 
argument appeals to grounds that the audience will accept. If the au-
dience includes many people who do not share one's religious convic-
tions, the most effective persuasion will rely on other than narrow 
religious arguments. Thus, the course I have suggested not only re-
lates to liberal principles; it is also a maxim about effective advocacy 
for religious persons. Since most religious people will not clearly iden-
tify where religious conviction leaves off and other values and factual 
judgments begin, they will usually suppose that the position they take 
will be the right one, even apart from religious conviction, and they 
will not be insincere if they make arguments in nonreligious terms. 
I am not suggesting that someone actually try to conceal the place 
of religious conviction. Suppose that a speaker has urged protection of 
the fetus on nonreligious grounds. If asked by a member of the audi-
ence "Isn't it true that your religious beliefs inform your judgment 
that the fetus is entitled to life?" he should answer "yes" if that is the 
case. Indeed, he might even say at the beginning of his own speech 
that religious convictions undoubtedly have an effect on one's views of 
the topic, but that he is going to present an argument that does not 
rely on such premises. Acknowledging the important place of reli-
gious conviction is quite different from developing an argument in nar-
rowly religious terms. What I claim would not be appropriate would 
be detailed citation of biblical passages or the writings of church fa-
thers, or a full analysis of how a particular religious doctrine is to be 
understood. 
My own sense, particularly sharp with respect to abortion, is that 
public dialogue would be enriched if the role of all nonrational prem-
ises, including religious convictions, were more fully revealed, though 
I am hesitant to say that doing so is a condition of good citizenship in 
a liberal democracy. Most notably, the result of greater disclosure 
might be greater tolerance for those who adopt varying nonrational 
premises. 
The argument for full candor might be turned around to mount a 
second objection - a challenge to my basic thesis that citizen reliance 
on religious convictions is proper. The claim would be that public 
dialogue should both provide a basis for reasoned resolution of social 
issues by all citizens and reflect actual grounds of individual decisions. 
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Since discourse about religious convictions fails the first test, only ra-
tional secular arguments should be made publicly. Since discourse 
should reflect actual grounds of decisions, people should try hard to 
· rely on rational secular grounds for their own political positions. We 
can see now how assumptions about the quality of public discourse 
can be used to support the claim that rational secular grounds should 
be the exclusive bases for citizens' decisions. 
My response is to repeat that a viable theory of liberal democracy 
cannot demand the impossible. If rational grounds are radically in-
conclusive about major social issues, one cannot expect wholly rea-
soned resolution of those problems. If liberal theory really requires 
that, then the poverty of liberal theory is shown; but I claim that the 
principles of liberal democracy are not so rigorously rationalistic. 
Before completing discussion of the proper role of religious beliefs 
in the political discourse of private citizens, I shall comment briefly on 
a special problem that arises about religious leaders. The problem is 
whether such leaders should support particular candidates or urge 
that voters decide which candidates to support on the basis of single 
issues. The question is, of course, not the indisputable right of reli-
gious leaders to take such actions, but whether these actions are desir-
able and in harmony with the spirit of a liberal policy. In general, 
such involvement in the political process is unwise, since it tends to 
link religious leaders and organizations too closely to the government. 
The broad policy of major religious groups not to support particular 
political candidates reflects a wise prudential policy not to mix practi-
cal religion and practical politics too closely. But on a matter such as 
this, one cannot be absolute. If the government pursues a policy that 
is so abhorrent from a religious point of view that it dominates all 
other issues, or if a candidate strongly supports a set of values that is 
directly at odds with values a religion takes as preeminent, then a reli-
gious leader may make an exception to ordinary principles of restraint. 
One could not fault religious leaders during the civil rights era if they 
urged votes against rabid segregationists. The controversy over abor-
tion is more troublesome, but if a religious leader really believes that 
permissive abortion results in the murder of millions of humans, the 
jssue takes on an understandable preeminence that it does not have for 
most people. 
The organization of political interests and positions along religious 
lines presents another question. Religious leaders urging political con-
clusions certainly may aim for coordination within a denomination to 
develop and disseminate appropriate positions. For example, the 
adoption of stands on public issues by Roman Catholic bishops and 
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the direction that these stands be conveyed to Catholics in individual 
parishes are appropriate activities in a liberal society. 
Attempts to organize people along religious lines for overtly polit-
ical purposes is much more dubious. Here again, effective strategy and 
observance of the spirit of liberalism largely coincide. A minority reli-
gion that creates its own narrow political action group or political 
party is -not likely to promote its political objectives with maximum 
effectiveness. Such efforts will make its positions seem sectarian, leav-
ing some outsiders indifferent and inducing hostility among others 
who wish to avoid dictation by religious views they do not accept. 
Political organization that bridges religious divisions is likely to be 
more effective and is more consonant with the broad principle that 
religion and politics should remain roughly separate. 
I now turn to public officials. How far may they take religious 
convictions into account in performing their public roles? I shall con-
centrate on legislators and judges. 
Legislators must vote on proposed legislation. Because they are 
also leaders of public political opinion and their political positions 
partly determine whether voters will approve their performance, they 
must formulate and advocate views on laws and policies in public. 
I am going to make four simplifying assumptions. The first is that 
a prospective legislator running for office is in the same position as a 
present legislator. Whatever may be true of fringe candidates who 
have no hope of being elected but wish their candidacies to symbolize 
something, a person with a realistic chance of being elected should 
develop his positions in a manner similar to that of legislators in office. 
However often such bonds may be broken, candidates do have some 
obligations of fidelity to their constituents to stick to positions asserted 
during the campaign, and they have a duty of honesty not to misrepre-
sent how they will decide issues once they are elected. 
A second assumption is that we can disregard the extent to which 
legislators may compromise otherwise appropriate standards in the in-
terests of odd constituencies and electability. Suppose that most citi-
zens in a district take a distinctly illiberal view of the proper place of 
religious conviction in the making of public policy, and will not vote 
for anyone who disregards their religiously based views. Perhaps a 
legislator could reasonably compromise ideal principles in the service 
of his constituents and the interests of being reelected, especially if the 
likely alternative is election of someone wholly indifferent to liberal 
principles. How far political actors should adhere to "correct" stan-
dards and damn the consequences, and how far they should bend to 
what is realistically possible, is a pervasive and troubling question, but 
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one that I avoid. I assume that a legislator's faithfulness to proper 
liberal principles does not threaten his continuance in office. 
A third simplifying assumption is that we can disregard differences 
between the interests and wishes of a particular legislator's constitu-
ents and those of the entire body of citizens. How far a legislator 
should promote the particular welfare and views of his own district as 
contrasted with those of the general population is an important ques-
tion (related to the divergence between "delegate" and "trustee" theo-
ries of representation discussed below), but one that by itself is not 
central for our purposes. 
My fourth simplification is to talk about legislators without dis-
cussing the role of political parties. In many liberal democracies, 
party decision effectively determines how individual legislators vote. 
Parties are not nearly so powerful in the United States, but party influ-
ence and loyalty is still an important factor in some votes. To a large 
extent, the questions I discuss in terms of individual legislative choice 
could also be addressed in terms of the position that those who control 
political parties should take. 
Once we have eliminated these various complexities concerning 
what legislators should do, we are left with a rough cleavage in tradi-
tional theories of representation. The "delegate" theory, which en-
joyed considerable prominence in colonial America, is that the 
legislator should act according to the views of those he represents. 
The "trustee" approach, associated with Edmund Burke's famous 
"Bristol speech,"21 is that the legislator is empowered to make up his 
own mind about what is sound public policy. Both views in extreme 
form are implausible. The more serious questions are precisely how 
much and when representatives should be guided by one perspective 
rather than the other. For our inquiry about the role of religious con-
victions, we do not have to worry about how much weight in which 
contexts each perspective should have; we need only understand that 
legislators often should accord weight to constituency views and often 
should try to determine for themselves what a sound decision would 
be. 
If proper deference to constituency opinion meant a completely 
passive reflection of constituents' v.iews, the question about reliance on 
constituents' religious convictions would answer itself; representatives' 
indirect reliance on religious convictions would mirror the direct reli-
ance of relevant constituents. But I suppose that legislators, even 
21. E. BURKE, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in 2 THE WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 89 (3d 
ed. Boston 1869). 
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when acting as "delegates," have some duty to screen out political 
views, or grounds for political views, that are at odds with liberal dem-
ocratic premises. To revert to an example I used in Part I, a legislator 
should certainly not vote against minority preferences because of con-
stituent views, if those views are based on desires to perpetuate racial 
subjugation. Or suppose that citizens rely on religious convictions in 
some other way that is not consonant with liberal principles; they 
want to suppress actions just because they are sinful. A courageous 
legislator who considers liberal principles to be the secure foundation 
of our political order should refuse to go along. Rather, he should try 
to persuade voters that policy in a liberal democracy is not properly 
made on such grounds. 
When private individuals rely on religious convictions in a way 
that is consistent with the liberal spirit, should legislators give views 
formed in this way,any weight at all, and, if so, should they give them 
the same weight as is given to positions formed in other ways, or less 
weight? 
We have reason to start with an assumption that legislators may 
properly rely on constituents' positions formed in a proper manner. It 
would be paradoxical to say that citizens can make up their minds and 
vote on certain grounds but that legislators may not take the resulting 
conclusions into account. 
Should it be objected that since public officials must represent the 
entire spectrum of religious views, they should not give weight to posi-
tions based on particular religious opinions, my answer resembles 
what I have already stressed about citizens. When issues cannot be 
settled on rational secular grounds, it is hard to see why legislators 
should give weight to nonreligious judgments of value and not to reli-
gious ones. Many of the values now reached by a secular consensus 
are held today because they were earlier held as matters of religious 
conviction. If these values cannot be established on rational grounds, 
legitimate legislative reliance should not depend on whether their reli-
gious origins are still recognized. 
I am contending that legislators must sometimes rely on nonratio-
nal grounds and that the nonreligious, nonrational judgments of con-
stituents should not be preferred to their religious convictions as bases 
for political positions. What of the possible argument that legislators 
should rely on the nonrational judgments of constituents only when 
those judgments are supported by an overwhelming consensus? There 
are some obvious difficulties with this suggestion. One concerns prem-
ises that are initially shared but begin to be challenged. Suppose that 
the full legal protection of newborns rests on nonrational judgments. 
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Legislators are warranted in providing this protection so long as al-
most everyone agrees that it is appropriate. But if a substantial 
enough percentage of people, say fifteen or twenty percent, starts to 
doubt that position, the consensus has disappeared. It would be odd 
to say that legislators must now disregard the nonrational belief of the 
great majority that protection should continue. A related difficulty is 
more general. Often no consensus will exist about a problem that can-
not be settled on rational grounds. Legislators must choose to protect 
or not protect. Their decision is bound to reflect one set of nonrational 
judgments in preference to another. It would not make sense to say 
that in such circumstances, the law must remain unaltered; that prin-
ciple would give too much weight to past practice and inertia. Nor 
would it make sense to say that in cases of division, legislatures should 
always refrain from legal prescription; application of that principle 
might demand that legislators sit by and allow what eighty percent of 
the people regard as the murder of innocent beings. 
I conclude that liberalism does not require legislators to disregard 
constituent views grounded in religious conviction when these views 
are themselves formed in accord with liberal principles. Legislators 
may give some weight to such views whether or not there is a consen-
sus behind them. 
The matter of how much weight to give these is more troublesome. 
Suppose, to present the question starkly, a legislator is considering two 
issues. On one, a substantial majority of constituents takes a position 
that it thinks is implied by shared premises underlying the political 
order. On the second issue, the majority is as great but the ground for 
the constituents' position is nonrational religious judgments. Reasons 
for deferring to constituency judgment may be especially powerful 
when citizens conceive of a position as required by justice, understood 
in terms shared broadly by society. Perhaps legislators should give 
less weight to judgments based on religious convictions than to judg-
ments thought to be rationally derived from broadly shared premises. 
When we tum to legislators relying on their own convictions, the 
place of religion is more controversial. As a public representative in a 
state that is separated from religious organizations, perhaps the legis-
lator should forgo reliance on religious premises insofar as he can. 
Everything I have said so far indicates how hard this might be to ac-
complish, but nonreliance might at least be held up as an ideal. 
Imagine first a situation like that I posed at the outset: 
Jean, a member of Congress, must decide in a special vote whether to 
risk extinction of a species of fish. She must unavoidably rely on her 
own judgment, because she is unable to ascertain public opinion or 
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thinks it is evenly divided. She sees the central question as coming down 
to whether the natural world is to be valued for its own sake. She real-
izes that her own view that it should be valued in this way is informed by 
her religious conviction about God's universe. She must make up her 
mind about how to vote. She is deeply uncertain what she would other-
wise think. 
Liberalism does not demand that legislators deny the effect of convic-
tions about which they feel deeply and which lead to positions also 
held by many who do not share their convictions. If a model of liberal 
democracy has nominal regard for the wholeness and integrity of reli-
gious persons, it cannot expect legislators, any more than private indi-
viduals, systematically to expunge all religious conviction as a guide to 
action. 
It is more debatable what a legislator should do when he decides 
whether to rely on his own judgment or those of constituents, and he 
recognizes the religious roots of his own position. On these occasions, 
subject to qualifications I shall not address here, I believe the legislator 
should be very hesitant to override contrary constituent judgments, 
that is, he should be very hesitant to proceed on his religious convic-
tions when he believes that constituent views are opposed to the polit-
ical position they yield. 
In sum, both constituent views and those of legislators themselves 
are entitled to greater weight when they are based on secular rational 
premises or rational applications drawn from shared premises than 
when they are self-consciously rooted in religious convictions or other 
unshared nonrational judgments; but legislators often can reasonably 
take into account nonrational judgments, and religious convictions 
more particularly. 
I need say relatively little about the nature of a legislator's political 
discourse. He is a public figure, representing people of all religious 
hues and in a government that is separate from any church. Usually 
he is speaking to and for a general audience, and his discourse should 
be in nonreligious terms. The country is so generally religious that 
vague invocations of religion and the deity may be acceptable - "God 
willing, we shall do our best"; "we are a religious people unlike the 
atheist Communists." There is also room in the public discourse of 
legislators for some expressions of personal outlook and feeling, and 
these may include reference to one's own religious convictions. But 
the serious urging of policies on the basis of particularistic religious 
premises is not proper. 
What about judges? Can we comfortably conclude that whatever 
others may do, judges should not rely on religious convictions in mak-
ing their decisions? Certainly we do not expect to see religious argu-
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ments in judicial opinions, so there is a strong presumption that in a 
liberal society judicial discourse should not include them. Neverthe-
less, occasional reliance by judges on religious convictions is not im-
proper. A full discussion of this topic would require a lengthy 
examination of judicial interpretation; I shall content myself with a 
few summary comments. I shall not address those instances, such as 
creches being placed in city parks, in which religious feelings of citi-
zens figure in an assessment of whether state actions amount to an 
establishment of religion. Nor shall I address the more general possi-
bility that religious convictions of members of the community may 
figure in community morality, when community morality is relevant 
under some legal standard. Rather, I shall talk about judges relying on 
their own convictions. 
Judicial opinions are formalized justifications for decisions. Opin-
ions are supposed to refer only to what is legally relevant. If a distinc-
tion, however blurred, exists between decisions that are required by 
the existing law and decisions that reflect a kind of judicial legislation, 
the legislative decisions are not fully revealed in the opinions them-
selves, which tend to mount up the legal sources in favor of a result. 
What is legally relevant is generally conceived to be the same for all 
judges, so neither personal religious convictions nor any other per-
sonal convictions are legally relevant. Given this understanding about 
judicial opinions, it follows that opinions should not contain direct 
references to the religious premises of judges. 
But can judges reasonably avoid reliance on their own religious 
convictions? There is a model of decision according to which judges 
are always seeking to determine which result would fit best with ex-
isting legal materials. If judges could always decide cases in this way, 
then they would never be in the position of having to rely on personal 
convictions of any sort. But such a model is implausible. Some legal 
terms, such as "cruel and unusual punishment" and "good moral 
character" seem to refer the judge outward to nonlegal domains. 
Many people believe that in a much broader class of difficult cases, 
judges-must, in a sense, legislate, since no determinate answer can be 
derived from existing legal materials. Even the most prominent mod-
ern spokesman for the law as discovery model, Ronald Dworkin, has 
made clear in recent writings that in choosing a theory that will best 
explain existing materials, a judge typically will have to make in-
dependent judgments of political morality, independent in the sense of 
not determined by the legal materials themselves.22 So, a wide spec-
22. See, e.g., Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982). 
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trum of opinion agrees that on some occasions judges cannot ulti-
mately rely exclusively on legal materials for answers, but must make 
independent judgments. That judges will have to make such judg-
ments does not necessarily mean that 'they will realize they are doing 
so. In actual cases it is very hard to say where the law runs out. But I 
am going to imagine the stark case in which the judge is fully aware 
that an independent judgment is needed. Now, one might claim that 
in all those situations, judges should simply refer to community moral-
ity; but community morality will often be nonexistent or undiscover-
able, and in any event at least sometimes judges should be deciding 
what is actually right, not what the community thinks is right. 
If this much is granted, judges sometimes will have to decide what 
is a correct answer to the relevant issue of moral and political philoso-
phy. Let us suppose, for example, that the judge is interpreting an 
environmental statute and the statutory language is unilluminating for 
the problem at hand. Resolution of the issue seems finally to tum on 
how much respect is owed by humans to the natural world, with no 
clear guidance from the statute itself or legislative history. I see no 
escape from the proposition that the judge, like the legislator, may in 
such settings find it necessary to rely on his religiously informed an-
swers to what is right, though the caution I offered about legislators' 
reliance applies even more strongly here. Each is a representative of a 
larger public, but the legislator is one of many and can be voted out of 
office. In some cases an individual judge will have the final say; in 
others his voice will be proportionately much more influential than 
that of an individual legislator. Therefore, the judge should be ex-
tremely wary of relying on his own religious convictions, especially 
when he recognizes that his premises or the positions they yield are 
not widely shared. When a choice is available between standards of 
decision, a judge who understands that his own preferred resolution 
rests on a particularistic religious premise should look carefully for 
some other basis to resolve the case. But when such judgments are 
genumely unavoidable, the judge should be able to rely on religious 
premises in the same manner as the citizen and the legislator. 
Finally, I want to address a few comments to the legal problem of 
constitutional law I have put to the side so far: what reliance on reli-
gious convictions in lawmaking amounts to an impermissible estab-
lishment of religion? I shall not be concerned with typical church-
state issues, such as assistance to religiously connected groups or reli-
gious exercises in public settings. These issues present serious consti-
tutional questions quite independent of the particular premises that 
underlie some piece of legislation. I shall be concerned with legislation 
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that forbids, requires or authorizes certain noncommunicative acts, 
when the reason why the acts are treated the way they are is traceable 
to religious conviction. 
I must be careful about what I mean by unconstitutionality, given 
the difference between legislative and judicial roles and all the com-
plexities of judicial appraisal of legislative action. I begin with the as-
sumption that if every legislator votes for a bill on grounds that are at 
odds with constitutional premises, the act is in some sense unconstitu-
tional even if alternative permissible grounds could have supported the 
same piece of legislation. In a more extended sense, a single legislator 
who votes on such grounds may be acting unconstitutionally, 
whatever the grounds that determine the votes of others. How far 
courts may investigate the actual purposes oflegislators is a deep prob-
lem; and, of course, in typical settings legislative motives will be 
mixed. But I shall suppose, in conformity with present establishment 
clause jurisprudence, that a dominant purpose to impose or promote a 
particular religious view could be relied upon by courts to invalidate 
legislation if that purpose were readily apparent. 
Let us assume that there is an unambiguous connection between 
religious convictions and resulting legislation. I do not think it mat-
ters whether the connection involves the legislator's own convictions 
or his simple deference to convictions of his constituents, and I shall 
disregard that distinction here. 
If legislation is adopted because behavior is bad, judged from a 
religious perspective, but without belief that that bad behavior causes 
secular harm to entities deserving protection, then the legislation 
should be held to violate the establishment clause. The basic argu-
ment is that to demand that other people act in accord with dominant 
religious beliefs is to promote or impose those beliefs in an impermissi-
ble way. The structure of this argument was suggested more than two 
decades ago by Louis Henkin, who argued that laws suppressing ob-
scenity might be viewed as upholding a religious conception of sin and 
might therefore be declared invalid under the establishment clause. 23 
A similar attack might be made against laws that forbid deviant sexual 
behavior among adults. Of course, plausible secular objectives might 
be used to defeat such attacks; and it may even be true that in few or 
no cases could the requisite findings of connection to religious belief be 
made. But if the unambiguous connection to religion can be shown to 
be the main basis for the legislation, the establishment argument 
should succeed. 
23. Henkin, supra note 2. 
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What of laws based on religious convictions that are actually at 
odds with rationality, laws that afford a protection that is opposed to 
any conclusion that might be reached by rational thought? Suppose, 
for example, that gray cats were accorded a protection not given to 
other cats because of their claimed religious importance. If we put 
aside a possible claim of permissible accommodation to deeply held 
religious feelings, that kind of protective legislation should be viewed 
as an establishment of religion, since treating a cat's fur color as rele-
vant to its moral status is patently unjustified from the standpoint of 
rational secular morality. A similar conclusion would obtain if a criti-
cal factual judgment on which legislation was based was actually irra-
tional. Instances of this sort of legislation are predictably nonexistent 
or very rare in a culture, such as ours, where religious perspectives are 
constantly reexamined in light of scientific knowledge and secular mo-
rality, and it is recognized that the law must govern people of diverse 
religious views. 
A law should not be treated as unconstitutional if the place of reli-
gious conviction is to define the entities that warrant protection or to 
help resolve conflicts of value when the critical question is not one that 
rational secular morality can resolve. A law protecting fetuses or aid-
ing the poor is not an establishment of religion, even if it is religious 
convictions that largely persuade people that fetuses or the poor war-
rant protection. I have already indicated why reliance on such views 
by citizens does not constitute an imposition of religion in the ordinary 
sense and further why such reliance not only is unavoidable and con-
stitutionally protected, but is proper for a good citizen in a liberal soci-
ety. These same reasons indicate why such reliance does not amount 
to a constitutionally invalid religious purpose or constitute an estab-
lishment of religion. Similar results should obtain when religious con-
victions figure in a weighing of concededly secular values or in difficult 
factual assessments. Even if policies on aid to the poor could be traced 
to religious premises about what society owes to its less fortunate 
members, or to religious premises about the inflexibility of human na-
ture, they should not be regarded as unconstitutional. 
I have indicated that my notions of what laws should be declared 
unconstitutional track rather closely my understanding of the implica-
tions of liberal democracy. I shall now briefly explain my rejection of 
certain other possible positions. 
One possibility is that active involvement by religious organiza-
tions in the adoption of legislation would render a resulting statute 
unconstitutional. Though occasionally rhetoric about the gross threat 
posed by political activities of religious organizations may suggest 
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such a constitutional principle, I am not aware of anyone who has 
seriously proposed and defended it. Two objections are conclusive. 
One is the unworkability of any test of degree here. How much activ-
ity and influence would be needed to make legislation unconstitu-
tional? The second objection concerns the disturbing implications for 
the political activity of religious groups. Not only are political efforts 
by these groups constitutionally protected, they should be deemed a 
healthy part of a liberal democracy. Although the political involve-
ment of religious groups is sometimes divisive, churches and related 
organizations represent both particular interests that warrant advo-
cacy and deep strains of conscience. The Constitution should not be 
interpreted to render legislation suspect whenever the activity of reli-
gious organizations has helped to promote it. 
For reasons that are somewhat more complicated, I also reject the 
notion that the Constitution requires legislators to give priority to ra-
tionally demonstrable values over nonrationally grounded ones when 
the two conflict. Read straightforwardly, Roe v. Wade does not sup-
port such a priority; rather it indicates that before viability the wo-
man's interest in having an abortion is simply stronger than the state's 
interest in preserving the fetus. But Roe v. Wade could be reconceptu-
alized to rest on the proposition that the rationally grounded claims of 
the pregnant woman must prevail for purposes of constitutional law 
over the claims of the fetus, which rest on nonrational judgments. 
Would such a principle be sound? What I have said in Part II indi-
cates why I think it would not. 
Our social morality is shot through with nonrational judgments, 
among them that human infants deserve the protection of mature 
human beings and that we should make some efforts to preserve dying 
species. It would be absurd to hold unconstitutional every legislative 
decision to implement one of those values at the expense of some other 
"rational" interest or value. Often the conflict will be between a 
widely shared and strongly held nonrational judgment and an undeni-
ably rational but very weak value, such as the economic benefits of 
killing members of a particular endangered species. 
To be plausible, the principle of priority for rational judgments 
would have to be qualified in some way, perhaps to assure priority 
only for rationally based values that are important, or are equal in 
power to competing nonrationally based values, or are in competition 
with values that are not supported by a consensus. But any distinction 
between rationally and nonrationally based values would be exceed-
ingly difficult for a court to apply in practice, especially since rational 
arguments of some power almost always support even those positions 
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I have claimed rest finally on nonrational judgments. To accord supe-
riority to rationally based values would be inappropriate because of 
the range and complexity of moral judgments that individuals and so-
cieties must make, and because of the uncertain borderlines of what is 
rational. 
Let me now say a few words in conclusion. Like most issues, the 
question of religion and politics proves much more complicated than 
appears at first sight and than many people would like to believe. This 
issue is peculiarly subject to oversimplification because it is obfuscated 
by rhetoric serving particular political objectives and because many 
intellectuals who think that religious convictions are foolish supersti-
tions want to minimize their legitimate position in social life without 
confronting them head on. 
I began my investigation believing that the claim that citizens and 
legislators should rely exclusively on rational secular grounds was defi-
nitely wrong. I have found it more difficult than I initially supposed to 
show that the claim is definitely wrong, but increasing familiarity has 
persuaded me that at the deepest level, the claim is not only wrong but 
absurd. It invites religious persons to displace their most firmly rooted 
convictions about values and about the nature of humanity and the 
universe in a quest for common bases of judgment, a quest that is inev-
itably quixotic when virtually everyone must rely on nonrational per-
spectives. Serious efforts by religious people to be model liberal 
citizens of the sort recommended would produce a frustrating aliena-
tion of their whole persons from their political characters. 
Rather than asserting any exclusivity for rational secular bases of 
judgment, sensible thought about a model of liberal democracy focuses 
mainly on domains of liberty and a more reasonable and constrained 
commitment to rationality. 
Perhaps the most important lesson of this entire exercise is that 
liberalism demands a high degree of tolerance and understanding -
not the tolerance of indifference, but a sympathetic mutual under-
standing of the place religious premises occupy in the life of serious 
believers and of the dangers to those of different beliefs if religious 
convictions and discourse overwhelm the common dialogue of rational 
secular morality. 
